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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997 the United States Trade Representative, Charlene
Barshefsky, announced that the United States would move
aggressively against Telefonos de Mexico ("Telmex")' in an effort
to pry open its monopolistic hold on the telecommunications sector
in Mexico. The action was in response to what Barshefsky saw as
Telmex intentionally hindering two U.S.-backed telecommunica-
tions rivals, Alestra and Avantel, from competing in the Mexican
marketplace for long-distance telephone service. This marked the
first time a telecommunications trade dispute was brought before
a multilateral regulatory body.' The two companies, with the
backing of Barshefsky, accused Telmex of charging exorbitant
interconnection fees (the charge for completing long-distance
calls), tacking on local service charges for calls made on competi-
tors' calling cards, and providing substandard connection quality.
The dispute arose primarily because as long-distance intercity
providers, the two companies had no choice but to pay Telmex for
access to its local copper-wire3 telephone network.4
The telecommunications industry in Mexico offers an excep-
1. Telefonos de Mexico maintains a very sophisticated webpage at http://www.
telmex.com.nix/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Telmex].
2. Vineeta Shetty, Fight Club: The Telecoms market in Mexico, COMM. INT'L, Jan.
1, 2001, at 48.
3. Copper-wire refers to "conventional" telephone lines other than wireless or
microwave networks.
4. Brendan M. Case, Mexico Lowers Telephone Rate, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Oct. 7, 2000, at IF.
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tionally lucrative new frontier for telecommunications companies
looking to expand into Latin America. During the 1990's, the
number of telephone lines doubled and the sector grew four times
faster than the rest of the economy.5 Noting that only eleven per-
cent of the Mexican population have fixed line telephones' (about
ten lines for each one hundred people'), a number of telecom ana-
lysts projected outstanding growth over the next decade,
spearheaded by advances in telephone network technologies and
the rapid expansion of wireless services and electronic commerce
ventures. Many analysts compare the Mexican and Latin Ameri-
can markets to the United States market of more than a dozen
years ago; the earning potential is staggering.
The world of international telecommunications is one of end-
less maneuvering among rivals to protect market share, out-posi-
tioning competition through the making and breaking of
international alliances and joint-ventures, and threatening legal
action in order to gain leverage and/or force concessions. Telmex
epitomizes how powerful corporate entities in Mexico have been
protected by the government and used to enrich and protect the
personal wealth and political ambitions of the ruling elite. In
exchange, the government, which from 1929 until 1990 was the
embodiment of the National Revolutionary Party ("PRI"), 8 pro-
tected the interests of Telmex. The challenge that Mexico now
confronts is how the symbiotic relationship between the govern-
ment and its large businesses will give way to the global trade and
commerce regimes to which Mexico has become a signatory,
namely, the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")
and the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). Even after its priva-
tization in 1990, Telmex continued to enjoy the protection of the
Mexican government by a routine of passive enforcement of Mexi-
can laws that were intended to stimulate competition and foreign
investment. The new presidency of opposition party leader
Vicente Fox,9 however, has signaled a sea of change in how Mexico
will conduct itself in the world of multinational corporations and
5. Shetty, supra note 2, at 48.
6. Id.
7. Anthony DePalma, Once a Monopoly and Still a Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
2000, at Wl. That number is compared to about 60 per 100 people in the United
States.
8. Rafael X. Zahralddin & C.Todd Jones, Venture Capital Opportunities and
Mexican Telecommunications after the Passage of the NAFTA and the Ley de Inversi6n
Extranjera, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 899, 904 (1995).
9. Vicente Fox ousted the PRI on a reform ticket to become President of Mexico
on July 2, 2000.
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business, beginning with moves by President Fox to shake up the
Telmex strangle hold on the telecommunications sector and lay
the groundwork for bringing foreign competition into Mexico.
Massing on the border is any number of United States-based tele-
communications companies, anxious to establish a foothold on
Mexican soil.
This article will delve into how Telmex, with the tacit collu-
sion of the Mexican government, has been able to protect its de
facto monopoly in the face of concerted efforts by international
telecommunications companies to establish a substantial competi-
tive foothold on Mexican soil. We will examine, by example of the
Telmex case, the anti-competition obstacles U.S. ventures must
overcome in order to expand into foreign markets, and how the
U.S. government can bring pressure to bear on foreign govern-
ments to open domestic markets to foreign competition. We will
also look at how Telmex has tried to defend itself from antitrust
charges brought by the United States before the WTO, and how
privatization may proceed in the telecom sector in Mexico under
the Fox administration.
II. THE TELECOMMUHNICATIONS SECTOR IN MEXICO
The International Telecommunications Union published the
following summation of the international telecommunications
sector:
The international telecommunications environment has
historically been based on a framework of bilateral rela-
tions: between countries and latterly between operators.
This regime is enshrined in the International Telecommu-
nication Regulations, an international treaty which dates
back to the early days of telegraph communications
between sovereign states. What is now emerging is a multi-
lateral regime, based on trade principles and captured in
the WTO trade in services regime. As a result of this para-
digm shift, traditional arrangements for carrying interna-
tional calls and settling accounts are coming under
increasing pressure.1 °
According to the Union's report, international telephone calls
in 1998 amounted to over ninety billion minutes, with a projected
10. International Telecommunication Union, Direction of Traffic: Trading Telecom
Minutes (1999), at http://www.itu.intITU-D/ict/publications/dot/1999/page4_dot.html
(last visited Dec. 15, 2001).
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growth to over one hundred billion minutes in 1999.1' Of the calls
placed, about seventy-five percent of outgoing international traffic
was from twenty-three developed countries, while incoming inter-
national calls to the same developed countries accounted for only
fifty-seven percent of international traffic. 12 For most of the twen-
tieth century, the service utilities were a cash cow for government
insiders, a means for politicians and their family relations to gain
wealth and status in the Latin American hierarchy. Because the
utilities had a monopoly over the market, there was little concern
for providing services and procuring innovation in the vacuum of
any competition. But the age of large government bureaucracies
running and prospering from huge entities in the service sector is
quickly drawing to a close. The end of the large government
bureaucracy is due mainly to the inability of the bureaucracy to
(1) keep pace with the rapidly changing technologies that drive
innovation and efficiency in the market place, and (2) to provide
considerable working capital, in an efficient and decisive manner,
as a means of holding off competitors flush with money and
backed by aggressive foreign investors. Telmex is a case study of
how the traditional government-owned or controlled monopolies in
Latin America are grudgingly yielding to the new economic and
business reality taking hold in the region. Mexico is the second
largest trading partner of the United States after Canada, having
surpassed Japan in 1999.'" The telecommunications battle in
Mexico is of particular importance because it is the foundation of a
global business infrastructure. Whomever captures market domi-
nance over local phone lines, long-distance and international prov-
iders, and Internet and wireless services will be in a position to
exert enormous influence over international trade and commerce
in the formative years of the new century.
The long-distance telecommunications corridor between the
United States and Mexico is one of the busiest and most lucrative
in the world,14 and Telmex has long enjoyed the lion's share of rev-
enues generated from that traffic. But with about twice the num-
ber of calls between both countries originating in the United
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The U.S. export market to Mexico has been growing at a double-digit rate over
the last six years. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2000
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, at http:/vww.ustr.gov/
pdf/2000_mexico.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2001).
14. Elliot Blair Smith, Mexican Phone Company Sets Sights on 'Telepirates, USA
TODAY, June 19, 2001, at 6B.
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States, domestic American carriers were anxious for Telmex to
lower its connection fees or force Mexican telecommunications
regulators to pry open the long distance market to foreign compe-
tition. 5 When the Mexican government opened the market to for-
eign competition in 1997, Telmex reduced connection fees by half.
But the rate was still so significantly higher that Barshefsky
threatened to file a complaint against Telmex with the WTO on
behalf of U.S. companies venturing into the Mexican market.16
III. TELMEX: THE 800 POUND GORILLA
After ten years of negotiation, Telmex7 was formed on
December 23, 1947, from the fusion of Empresas Tel6fonos Erics-
son and Compafifa Telef6nica y TelegrAfica Mexicana, S.A. The
shares in the new company were divided between Corporaci6n
Continental (with capital from investors in the United States
holding 51.24 %, and Ericsson, holding 48.75 %), and three Mexi-
can businesses holding 0.05 %.18 In 1950, there was a move to try
to capitalize Telmex with Mexican investors only. In 1956, a regu-
lation was issued requiring Telmex customers to buy shares in the
company in exchange for priority in installation of services. That
regulation remained in effect until 1990.19 In 1958, two Mexican
businessmen met with Ericsson officials to buy out Ericsson's
shares.2" Ericsson's involvement with Telmex ended on August
19, 1958. By 1960, Telmex had close ties with the Mexican presi-
dency, which allowed the company to receive major governmental,
financial and technological support, and to become a de facto
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. MELISSA TOMLINSON, LATIN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: A STUDY OF
DEREGULATION AND PRIVATIZATION IN ARGENTINA, CHILE AND MEXICO 113-115 (1995).
As for the early manifestations of telephone and telegraph services in Mexico, the first
telephone concession was awarded in 1881. A year later Compania Telefonica
Mexicana S.A. was formed and assumed the license. In 1908, Compania Telefonica
was renamed S.A. A Swedish consortium had been granted an operating license in
1905. While there were smaller local companies operating in the country, these two
companies were the only national telephone companies in Mexico. In 1925,
International Telephone and Telegraph ITT, from the United States, won a license to
take over La Compania Telefonica y Telegrafica Mexicana. By 1932, IT "had linked
the Mexican system to AT&T in the United States and to other ITT operations in
Latin America." Tetmex was formed in 1947 when Empresa de Telefonos Ericsson
was acquired by a foreign venture. Id. For an excellent source written in Spanish on
the history and development of Telmex, see RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ CASTA.&EDA,
OPERACI6N TELMEX: CONTACTO EN EL PODER 56 (1995).
18. CASTAREDA, supra note 17, at 56.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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monopoly.21 In fact, public financing was never denied to Telmex
and no labor strikes against it were ever successful. A milestone
in the technological development of Telmex further entrenched its
relationship with the federal government when Mexico hosted the
1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City.22 At that time, the Secreta-
riat of Communications and Transportation ("SCT") overhauled
the Telmex infrastructure with the installation of subterranean
lines and transmission towers, and built a corporate headquarters
for the utility. In 1972, President Echeverria's government
acquired fifty-one percent of Telmex's capital stock. 3 In March
1976, the SCT renewed the Telmex concession for thirty years and
the company was incorporated into the Communications and
Transportation branch of the government.24 The growth of Telmex
moved along at a slow rate under the Mexican bureaucracy, until
1985 when the disastrous earthquakes in Mexico City caused
more than twenty-five million dollars in damage to the Telmex
infrastructure.25 The earthquakes severed 1,060 long distance
lines and 14,500 local lines, and destroyed twenty-six Telmex
facilities.2 6 The disaster, however, presented the opportunity for
Telmex to modernize its networks and build a new telephone sys-
tem incorporating fiber-optic and digital microwave technologies.27
When Carlos Salinas came to power in the 1980's, one of his
goals was to clean up the poor image of Telmex in order to make
Telmex attractive enough to potential investors to privatize it.2"
To accomplish this makeover, Telmex's internal organization was
split into five operational divisions and four administrative divi-
sions,' 9 contracts were renegotiated, labor leaders were offered
larger stakes in the company, ° and great efforts were made to
polish Telmex's reputation."1 "As part of the dis-incorporation
plan during 1990, authorities took a series of actions of cleaning
and decoration that in reality constituted the cherry on the cake
21. Id. at 57.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 58.
24. Id.
25. For a concise history of telecommunications in Mexico, see TOMLINSON, supra
note 17, at 114.
26. CASTAREDA, supra note 17, at 59.
27. TOMLINSON, supra note 17, at 114.
28. CASTAREDA, supra note 17, at 60.
29. TOMLINSON, supra note 17, at 114.
30. Telmex eliminated fifty-seven labor agreements and job categories were cut
back from 1000 to 140. Is it possible that the offer of large stakes to labor leaders was
intended to keep them quiet?
31. CASTAISEDA, supra note 17, at 62.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:2 & 3
destined for future buyers."32 Moreover, tariff schedules were re-
structured, but in order to do so, the government transferred
Telmex from the SCT to the Ministry of Public Finance.
In 1990, the government repealed the tax on consumption,
which then allowed Telmex to increase its earnings by sixty-eight
percent for local service and one hundred percent for long distance
service.3 More importantly, the Ministry of Public Finance cre-
ated a new service tax (Impuesto por Prestaci6n de Servicios
Telef6nicos) ("IPST") equivalent to twenty-nine percent of the
company's income. There was a clause initiated that during the
five years beginning in 1991, Telmex could retain, and credit,
sixty-five percent of that tax as an investment. With another
advantage, the company preserved the right to deduct the totality
of that twenty-nine percent tax. The revenues from this arrange-
ment made Telmex extremely profitable in subsequent years.
Some argue that "the conditions of this IPST violated the Consti-
tution, which expressly established that income obtained by the
state through taxes has to be applied for public expenditures. In
the case of Telmex, the Ministry of Public Finance, practically
gifted to Telmex the money in cash." ' Complimentary to this, a
great part of Telmex's debt with foreign investors was shifted to
the Mexican government.
By the time Telmex was ready for the auction block in 1990,
Telmex assets had reached 28.5 billion pesos, with profits of 3.3
billion pesos, an eighty-two percent increase from 1989. The
privatization went through when the Salinas government
awarded fifty-one percent control3" to a group comprised of strate-
gic alliances with international entities, including Carso Global
Telecom, France Telecom, Williams Communications, and Texas-
based SBC Communications (formerly Southwestern Bell), which
still holds a 7.6% share. 8 The concession was awarded for fifty-
one years and granted a virtual monopoly for six years.39 The
partnerships provided Telmex with the capital to undertake an
additional U.S. $2.6 billion modernization of its service infrastruc-
32. Id. at 61.
33. Id. at 62.
34. Id. at 63.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 76-78.
37. ToMLINSON, supra note 17, at 115.
38. See the SBC webpage at http:/www.sbc.com/InternationalGlobal-Invest
ments/0,2951,4,00.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2001).
39. CASTAREDA, supra note 17, at 67. For a more complete explanation of the
terms, see CASTAI-EDA, supra note 17, at 82.
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ture and helped establish Telmex's primacy in preparation for the
entry of competition in the Mexican telecommunications market,
when restrictions were lifted by the Mexican government in 1997.
An additional sixteen to eighteen billion was spent in 1999 to fur-
ther modernize Telmex's infrastructure. 4 Improvements included
a nearly complete conversion to a digital network and a drop in
the waiting period for installing phone lines from up to two years
in 1990, to about twenty-seven days in 1999."'
As of the first trimester 2001, Telmex had 12,379,667 tele-
phone lines and over 1.1 million data lines42 in service nationwide,
with an annual service line growth rate of 10.5 percent.43 The
Mexican telecommunications market is estimated to be worth in
the order of U.S. $5.7 billion a year.44 Telmex's financial perform-
ance places it among the top technology companies in the world,
with Telmex controlling "58% of the market for international calls
originating in Mexico, 68% of the domestic long-distance market,
and 97% of the local market,"" including "last-mile" connections in
both the residential and business sectors.46 More than 6.2 billion
calls were made over Telmex lines in 2000, with coverage in more
than 105 thousand towns representing approximately 98.6% of
Mexico's inhabitants. 4
According to its 2000 Annual Report, Telmex's assets totaled
$156,886,061,000 pesos.4" The booming wireless market in Mexico
has also increased Telmex's revenues because wireless providers
must pay fees to Telmex in order to complete calls over the Telmex
network. Telmex trades on the New York Stock Exchange and
has proven to be a consistent and popular stock for telecommuni-
40. See Mensaje de Director, available at http://www.telmex.com/internos/estoes/
esto-mensaje.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001). See also Shetty, supra note 2, at 48.
41. Shetty, supra note 2, at 48.
42. Telmex Announces Agreement to Reduce Mexico-U.S. Settlement Rates,
BUSINESS WIRE, May 30, 2001, at 1.
43. See Telmex, Que es Telmex, available at http//www.telmex.com/internos/
estoes/quees.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001).
44. Simeon Tegel, Cease Fire, LATIN TRADE, Sept. 2001, available at LEXIS, News
File.
45. Elizabeth Malkin, Mexico's 800-pound Gorilla, Bus. WK., June 18, 2001, at
113.
46. James F. Smith, Telmex, Rivals Reach Accord to Cut Phone Fees, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 2001, at Cl.
47. In 1990, when Telmex was privatized, there were only 5.35 million lines in
service with coverage to only some 10,200 towns.
48. See Telmex, Annual Report 2000, available at http://www.telmex.com/
internos/inversionistas/finanzas/pdf/cbs00.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2001).
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cations investors.49 Telmex represented about twenty-nine per-
cent of the Mexican stock exchange's "market weight" in year
2000.50
Telmex has a number of subsidiaries spanning much of the
telecommunications sector. Anuncios Directorios Secci6n
Amarilla ("ADSA") has been the primary yellow pages publisher
in Mexico for more than seventy years, and "is the only company
in Mexico that offers the option to advertise in a nationwide tele-
phone directory, the Internet, and in any telephone directory in
the world."5" Red Uno is Mexico's leading telecommunications
company for providing voice, data, and video solutions to the cor-
porate market in Mexico. Telnor provides telecommunications
services to the states of Baja and northwestern Sonora. Uninet is
Telmex's data network subsidiary responsible for transporting
data and files over a secure network, and Telbip provides paging
services to thirty-three cities and five hundred towns in Mexico.2
Telmex has also invested in foreign telecommunications markets,
expanding into telecommunications and Internet services in
Puerto Rico, Guatemala, Brazil, and the United States.'
Even with the growth of the Telmex network in the last dec-
ade, Telmex continues to struggle with the challenge of how to
expand its market share in a nation where consumer income is
low. In 2000, for example, Telmex charged $115 to install a resi-
dential phone line, and one fifteen-minute call to the United
States cost about six dollars.5" In a country where the average
daily wage is eleven dollars, phone service for most of Mexico is
still an unattainable luxury.5
49. See the New York Stock Exchange financial analysis page for Telmex,
available at. http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/marketinfo.html?sym=tmx&x=13&y=9
(last visited Dec. 11, 2001). The value of Telmex shares rose ten percent in 2001 as
the Standard & Poor's Telecom Index dropped fifty percent. See Malkin, supra note
45, at 113.
50. Camila Castellanos, Off the Hook?, Bus. MEX., Aug. 1, 2000, available at
LEXIS, News File.
51. See Telmex webpage for subsidiary information, at http://www.telmex.coml
internos/englishlaboutlsubsidiaries.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2001).
52. Id.
53. See generally Castellanos, supra note 50.
54. Traci Carl, Callers, U.S. Phone Carriers in Common Cause Against High
Mexican Rates, ASS'D PRESS, Aug. 18, 2000, available at LEXIS, News File.
55. Id.
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IV. THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT'S REGULATION OF THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
A) The Mexican Constitution
Article 28 of the Constitution of Mexico provides that monopo-
lies and monopolistic practices shall be prohibited.6
In the United Mexican States there shall be no monopolies or
estancos of any kind; nor exemption from taxes; nor prohibitions
under the guise of protection to industry; excepting only those
relating to the coinage of money, the mails, telegraph, and radiote-
legraphy, to the issuance of paper money by a single bank to be
controlled by the Federal Government, and to the privileges which
for a specified time are granted to authors and artists for the
reproduction of their works, and to those which, for the exclusive
use of their inventions, may be granted to inventors and those who
perfect some improvement.
Consequently, the law shall punish severely and the
authorities shall effectively prosecute every concentration
or cornering in one or a few hands of articles of prime
necessity for the purpose of obtaining a rise in prices; every
act or proceeding which prevents or tends to prevent free
competition in production, industry or commerce, or ser-
vices to the public; every agreement or combination, in
whatever manner it may be made, of producers, industrial-
ists, merchants, and common carriers, or those engaged in
any other service, to prevent competition among them-
selves and to compel consumers to pay exaggerated prices;
and in general, whatever constitutes an exclusive and
undue advantage in favor of one or more specified persons
and to the prejudice of the public in general or of any social
class.57
Under the Mexican Constitution, any foreigners who desire to
pursue business in Mexico must waive their right to assert their
status as foreign citizens, and prior approval of the Secretariat of
Foreign Affairs is required before a company may incorporate in
Mexico."
Mexico has enacted a number of laws to regulate the telecom-
munications sector during the last century. Two laws enacted in
56. MEx. CONST. art. 28 (1917) am. 1988. For a Spanish version of the
Constitution available on the Internet, available at httpJ/mexico.udg.mx/politica/
constitucion/tlcapl.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2001).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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the middle of the century were the Law of General Routes of Com-
munications of 1939,"9 followed the next year by the Communica-
tions Law of 1940. Together with the Telecommunications
Regulations, adopted in 1990, the three laws "provide the general
framework for the regulations of telecommunications services in
Mexico,"' along with other telecommunications regulations
adopted in 1990 with the Federal Telecommunications Law."
According to the Telecommunications Regulations of 1990 a sup-
plier of public telecommunications services would "operate under
a license granted by the Communications Ministry." 2 The licenses
were only granted to Mexican corporations or citizens, and prior
approval of the Communications Ministry was required in order to
transfer the licenses.
The Secretariat of Communications and Transport ("SCT")
was the regulatory agency tasked with monitoring and regulating
the growing telecommunications sector.' SCT oversight was
accomplished through the Undersecretariat for Communications
and Technological Development. 5 That ministry was responsible
for overseeing growth in the telecommunications sector, regulat-
ing changes in service infrastructure by providers and reviewing
quarterly reports by telecommunications businesses for compli-
ance and expansion agendas.6
The SCT has plenary authority for regulation of the tele-
communications industry. It is empowered to formulate
and conduct the policies and programs to promote modern
and efficient telecommunications. Coverage, quality and
rates are to be "adequate to the country's needs."67
The SCT has exclusive power to issue permits and conces-
sions to install, establish, operate and exploit networks,
stations and telecommunications services. 68
59. Law of General Routes of Communications, D.O., Feb. 19, 1940. For the most
current version of the law see Ultima Reforma Aplicada, April 1, 1999, at httpJ/www.
cddhcu.gob.mx/leyinfo/73/1.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2002).
60. TOMhNSON, supra note 17, at 115.
61. Federal Telecommunications Law, D.O., 7 Junio 1995.
62. TOMLINSON, supra note 17, at 115.
63. Id.
64. STEVEN HARPER, INSIDE LATIN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: A STUDY OF
PRIVATIZATION AND COMPETITION IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, AND MEXICO 194
(1997).
65. Id.
66. TOMLINSON, supra note 17, at 116.
67. Paul J. Berman & Theodore Hirsch, Foreign Telecommunications
Participation in Mexico, 653 PLI/CoMM 369, 372 (1993).
68. Id.
194
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B) The Mexican Foreign Investment Law
Another important law affecting the telecommunications sec-
tor is the Mexican Foreign Investment Law of 199369 ("FIL"),
which governs how foreign companies and entities can do business
in Mexico. This law was passed as Mexico became a full partici-
pant in NAFTA under the Salinas administration. Prior to enact-
ment of the FIL, foreign investment was tightly controlled and
limited"0 by the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regu-
late Foreign Investment of 1973"' ("LPMI"). The LPMI's primary
intent was to protect Mexican interests by placing restrictions on
direct foreign investment in the country.72 The darker side to the
LPMI, according to some opinions, is that the law facilitated
power grabbing by bureaucrats and increased institutional
corruption.73
Throughout much of the 1970's, the Mexican economy was
performing poorly, due in significant part to the protectionist poli-
cies of the government. When the oil boom ended in 1982, the
underpinnings of the protectionist strategy were destroyed
because the government no longer had the luxury of surviving on
revenues from high oil prices. The government then determined
that resolving the economic crisis required new policies to stimu-
late investment from foreign sources. The government was prod-
ded toward that realization in part from external pressures by the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), which recommended eco-
nomic liberalization.74 The de la Madrid administration, however,
resisted the IMF recommendations. When the situation worsened
in 1985, Mexico again entered into talks with the IMF. The Mexi-
can strategy was to accede to some liberalization, but to stand
firm over demands for austerity regarding how much more auster-
69. Foreign Investment Law, D.O., December 27, 1993, art. 1, translated in DOING
BusiNEss IN MEXICO, A.2-3 to A.2-27 (Andrea Bonime-Blane & William E. Mooz, Jr.
eds. 1994) [hereinafter FILl.
70. "The era of restrictive policies was largely the result of nationalistic tendencies
and a desire for industrialization." David J. Drez, Direct Foreign Investment in
Mexico's Telecommunications Market, 3-WTR NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. Am. 112, 116
(1997).
71. For an excellent annotated version of the law see, Lionel Pereznieto C.,
Comentarios a la ley para promover la inversion Mexicana y regular la inversion
extranjera, EL FORO, Apr-Junio, 1973, available at http://www.bma.org.mx/publica
ciones/elforo/1973/abril-junio/comentarios.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2002).
72. Drez, supra note 70, at 116.
73. Zahralddin & Jones, supra note 8, at 907.
74. JuriTH A. TEICHMAN, PRIVATIZATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN MEXICO 79
(1995).
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ity Mexico could absorb.75 The IMF continued to pressure Mexico
throughout 1985 and 1986 to liberalize the markets, but most
importantly to tighten the government's belt. Finally, in 1987
trade liberalization measures moved forward. By 1988, ninety-six
percent of imports no longer required import permits.76 By 1989,
the Salinas administration was firmly committed to trade liberali-
zation and an agreement was negotiated under the Brady Plan in
early 1990. 7 The Brady Plan offered debt reduction in exchange
for reforms that included foreign investment, privatization, and
trade liberalization." A letter of intent was drafted between Mex-
ico and the IMF emphasizing Mexico's achievement in opening the
economy and pledging Mexico's willingness to continue trade lib-
eralization." The World Bank, too, "had been pressuring Mexico
to accelerate and extend its economic liberalization drive.""
A few months after the Brady Plan was unveiled, the Salinas
75. Id. at 82.
76. Id. at 88.
77. The Brady Plan was named after U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicolas Brady, who
formulated a plan in 1989 for Latin American nations willing to reform their
economies to reduce a collective $400 billion foreign commercial bank debt by
converting the debt into long-term bonds backed by American Treasury bills. Mexico
was the first Latin nation to negotiate a Brady arrangement, signed on February 4,
1990, in which "U.S. and other money center banks agreed to accept a roughly 18
percent reduction in the face value of their Mexican debt, in return for secured bonds
paying a discounted rate of interest." Two years later in 1991, the bonds were trading
at fifty-six cents, up from forty cents, and headed higher. This in turn resulted in the
creation of a large bond market trading what became known as Brady Bonds. In 1991
the Washington Times reported:
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari has ended most capital
controls, privatized half of Mexico's socialist industrial sector, cut
tax rates on both individuals and business, denationalized banks,
extended private property rights, and now pursues a free trade
agreement with the United States. Suddenly, capital that had been
hemorrhaging out of Mexico is surging the other way. In 1989 and
1990, some $11 billion in Mexican flight capital was repatriated.
Since May, Mexican companies have successfully floated bond and
equity issues in foreign markets. Its newly privatized phone
company Telmex issued $2 billion in shares overseas that were
immediately grabbed.
See Warren Brookes, Fueling Latin Recovery, WASH. TIMES, September 11, 1991, at
Fl. See also, Larry Rohter, Mexico's Recovery: Is It in Peril? N.Y. TIMES, February 3,
1990, at Sec. 1, p. 37.
78. TEICHMAN, supra note 74, at 90.
79. Id. at 91.
80. Id. It is interesting to consider that another economic crisis occurred in 1995
and 1996, due in large part to the Mexican government's unwillingness to embrace
the austerity measure the IMF recommendations made for public deficit reduction.
Mexico has yet to implement this part of the IMF plan.
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administration promulgated the Regulations to the LPMI81
("RLPMI"). The RLPMI "expanded the use of trust in the control
of enterprises."82 Through the trust, foreign interests could now
control industries that had once been restricted only to Mexican
ownership.83 As it pertained to the telecommunications sector, the
RLPMI regulations now allowed up to a forty-nine percent foreign
ownership in Mexican telecommunications entities and eventually
"precipitated the purchase of a 20.4% controlling share in Telmex
by an international consortium consisting of the Grupo Carso,
Southwestern Bell,84 and France Telecom."8"
The FIL followed on the heels of the changes brought about by
the RLPMI by further opening the door to foreign investment in
the telecommunications sector. The FIL established the rules "by
which foreign investment can be channeled to the country and to
ensure that such investments contribute to the national develop-
ment."6 Moreover, the FIL abolished "all performance require-
ments (except where certain investment incentives are involved
and those that are not prejudicial to international trade);
expand[ed] the scope of the neutral investment provisions intro-
duced in the regulations; and reduce[d] or eliminate[d] many of
the notifications and authorizations previously required for for-
eign investments under the LPMI." 7
Article 15 of the FIL mandated that before a company could
incorporate in Mexico, prior approval of the Secretariat of Foreign
Affairs would be required.8 The Law also allowed for one hundred
percent direct foreign investment of ownership without the prior
authorization of the National Foreign Investment Commission
("CNIE") on behalf of the Ministry of Trade and Industrial Devel-
opment ("SECOFI")."9 That one hundred percent was in the
industrial sectors not specifically addressed in the law, telecom-
81. RLPMI, D.O., May 16, 1989 (Mex.), translated in DoING BussaEss IN MFxico,
A.4-3 (1994). For an in depth discussion of the regulations, see Jorge Camil, Mexico's
1989 Foreign Investment Regulations: The Cornerstone of a New Economic Model, 12
Hous. J. INTrL L. 1, 5-6 (1989).
82. Zahralddin & Jones, supra note 8, at 913.
83. Id. at 914.
84. Southwestern Bell has since become SBC Communications in the Telmex
partnership.
85. Zahralddin & Jones, supra note 8, at 924.
86. FIL, D.O., December 27, 1993, art. 1.
87. Timon L. Marshall, Foreign Investment in Mexico, Intertrade & Investment,
Nov. 1999, available at http://www.aimlink.com/I&Ilarchives/mexinv.html (last
visited Jan. 16, 2002).
88. FIL, D.O., Dec. 27, 1993, art. 15.
89. See generally Marshall, supra note 87. See also Drez, supra note 70, at 117.
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munications being one of the sectors specifically regulated by the
FIL. ° Before a company can proceed with incorporation, however,
it must seek prior approval from the Secretariat of Foreign
Affairs,9 and such companies must have "a foreign exclusion
clause or comply with Article 27, sec. 1 of the Mexican Constitu-
tion."92 One must appreciate the drastic departure in the course of
less than two decades away from a protectionist policy that in
many ways defined the PRI party and the Mexican state for most
of the twentieth century.
The FIL identified foreign investment as being:
* Foreign investment in any percentage of the capital stock of
a Mexican company;
" A Mexican corporation's investment, if the majority of that
corporation is owned by foreign investors;
" Foreign investment in any of the activities or actions cov-
ered by the FIL;9'
" Investment by foreign entities with no legal status.94
Interestingly, the new law also allowed, for the first time, for-
eign corporate entities to own land for setting up business opera-
tions in previously restricted zones. 9 "Previous restrictions on
land ownership within 100 kilometers of the border and within 50
kilometers of the seashore were dropped."96 Also, the law gave to
non-North American investors many rights acquired by United
States and Canadian companies under NAFTA.9'
Even though the FIL repealed the entrenched nationalistic
and protectionist policies in many sectors, the law also curtailed
or severely limited foreign equity participation in at least four
industries and commerce activities:
1. Oil and petrochemical industries, satellite communica-
tions,9 telegraph services, and radiotelegraphy remain
under the exclusive control of the Mexican state-done to
comply with Mexican Constitutional requirements;99
90. Drez, supra note 70, at 117.
91. FIL, D.O., Dec. 27, 1993, art. 15.
92. Drez, supra note 70, at 120.
93. Id. at 117, citing FIL, D.O., June 7, 1996, art. 2.
94. See generally Marshall, supra note 87.
95. TOMLINSON, supra note 17, at 117.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. The Federal Telecommunications Law of 1995 amended art. 5 of the FIL to
exclude satellite communications from this restriction. See FTL, D.O., June 7, 1995;
Chapter IV, sec. 4, art. 56.
99. Id. at art. 5.
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2. Radio broadcasting and land transportation reserved
exclusively for Mexican nationals and Mexican companies
without foreign equity participation;"°
3. Specific industries in which foreign entities could hold only
minority stakes;
(a) production cooperatives-up to 10 percent ownership,
(b) domestic and specialized air transportation services-
up to twenty percent,
(c) financial holdings companies, commercial banks, secur-
ities firms and financial specialists-up to 30 percent,
(d) insurance, financial, leasing, telephone services, publi-
cations, newspapers-up to 49 percent.10 '
4. Activities in maritime transportation and port services for
which foreign investors must obtain prior approval from
the Foreign Investment Commission in order to own more
than a 40 percent stake. 102
In December 1996 sweeping and unusually progressive
amendments to the law took effect, which were intended to
achieve a number of important changes to the FIL, including
changes to:
" Eliminate unnecessary delays in the processing of many
government business requirements;
" Promote foreign investment in Mexico;
" Give added security to foreign investors investing in Mex-
ico; and
" Simplify procedures for investment in Mexico."0 3
The Amendments also established percentages and limita-
tions foreign entities could hold in business sectors that the Mexi-
can government considered "strategic or essential to the national
interest:"
104
1. Only the Mexican Government may own or engage in activ-
ities involving the production and sale of petroleum and
other hydrocarbon products, basic petrochemicals, electric-
ity (including the generation of nuclear energy), telegraph
100. Id. at art. 6.
101. Id. at art. 7.
102. Id. at art. 8.
103. Fernando Garcia, Amendments to Foreign Investment Law Simplify
Investment in Mexico, InterAm. Database, National Center for Inter-American Free
Trade (1997), available at http://www.natlaw.com/pubs/spmxfil.htm (last visited Dec.
11, 2001).
104. Id.
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communications, mail processing and delivery, and similar
public services.
2. Economic activities reserved exclusively to Mexicans or to
Mexican companies include the operation of credit unions,
retail trade in gasoline and liquid petroleum gas, national
surface transportation of passengers, tourism and trans-
portation of freight.
3. Certain investments may be made by foreigners, but only
in restricted ownership percentage amounts. For example,
foreign investment in "cooperative companies or produc-
tion" is limited to ten percent, and investment in domestic
air transportation, air taxi transportation and specialized
air transportation generally, is limited to twenty-five per-
cent. However, under the new changes to the Foreign
Investment Law, foreign ownership interest is not taken
into account if the foreign investment is made in a Mexican
corporation and if fifty-one percent of the capital of such
corporation is held by Mexicans. In addition, foreign inves-
tors may now hold up to forty-nine percent in companies in
almost all aspects of the Mexican financial system, includ-
ing holding companies for financial groups, commercial
banks, credit institutions, securities brokerage firms and
securities market specialists. Prior to the changes in the
FIL, the maximum percentage for foreign investors in
these corporations was thirty percent. Also, prior to the
amendments, foreign investment in cable television and
basic telephonic services was limited to forty-nine percent.
Now this limitation has been replaced with a forty-nine
percent limitation on all telecommunications for which a
government concession is required.
4. The amended FIL provides that foreign investors may hold
an interest in excess of forty-nine percent in certain busi-
nesses, but only with authorization from the special com-
mission or representative committee with jurisdiction
under the law. Authorization is required for the activities
of credit information companies, insurance agents, cellular
telephone operators, and oil and gas drillers.
C) Federal Telecommunications Law of 1995105
The Federal Telecommunications Law ("FTL") was enacted on
105. FTL, D.O., June 7, 1995, available at http://info4.juridicas.unam.mx/ijure/fed/
114/default.htm?s= (last visited Dec. 23, 2001).
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June 7, 1995, and superceded nearly all laws and regulations for-
merly governing the telecommunications sector. The promulga-
tion of the FTL coincided with Mexico's entrance into full
participation in NAFTA and established the telecommunications
sector as a high government priority."0 6 The FTL was intended to
embrace the spirit of social responsibility for the national good by
protecting public access to the nation's telecommunications
infrastructure.
0 7
The FTL includes almost all aspects of the telecommunica-
tions industry. The law describes telecommunications as "all
emission, transmissions, or reception of signs, signals, written
documents, images, voice sounds or information, of any nature,
via cables, radioelectricity, optical or physical means, or other
electromagnetic systems." °8 The FTL deems satellite communica-
tions systems, radio spectrums, and telecommunications networks
as "general paths of communication." 9
The FTL also includes the following objectives:
" Promote an efficient development of telecommunications;
" Carry out the state directives on this subject in order to
guarantee the national sovereignty;
" Promote healthy competition among the different telecom-
munication service providers so that they will offer better
prices, diversity, and quality of services in benefit of the
consumer; and
" Promote adequate social coverage."0
The SCT is tasked with achieving the objectives of the law."'
In order to do so, the SCT has several responsibilities, including:
" To plan, formulate and guide policies and programs;
" Regulate the development of the telecommunications;
" Promote and oversee the efficiency of the interconnection of
the various equipments of telecommunication;
" Issue official rulings;
106. Drez, supra note 70, at 122.
107. FTL, D.O., June 7, 1995, art. 50, available at http://info4.juridicas.unam.mx/
ijure/fed/ll4/default.htm?s= (last visited Dec. 23, 2001).
108. Id. at art. 3.
109. Id. at art. 4.
110. Id. at art. 7. "La presente ley tiene como objetivos promover un desarrollo
eficiente de las telecomunicaciones; ejercer la rectoria del estado en la materia, para
garantizar la soberania nacional; fomentar una sana competencia entre los diferentes
prestadores de servicios de telecomunicaciones a fin de que estos se presten con
mejores precios, diversidad y calidad en beneficio de los usuarios, y promover una
adecuada cobertura social."
111. Id.
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* Participate in the negotiation of international treaties;
" Promote and strengthen cultural values and national
identity;
" Promote research and technological development in tele-
communications; and,
" Interpret the FTL for administrative effects.112
The law establishes some limitations on foreign ownership,
reserves certain services for the Mexican state,'13 and protects
other activities for Mexican nationals or corporations with a for-
eign exclusion clause."4 Any entity interested in installing or
112. Id.
Para el logro de estos objetivos, corresponde a la secretaria, sin
perjuicio de las que se confieran a otras dependencias del ejecutivo
federal, el ejercicio de las atribuciones siguientes:
I. Planear, formular y conducir las politicas y programas, asi
como regular el desarrollo de las telecomunicaciones, con
base en el plan nacional de desarrollo y los programas
sectoriales correspondientes;
II. Promover y vigilar la eficiente interconexion de los
diferentes equipos y redes de telecomunicaci6n;
III. Expedir las normas oficiales mexicanas en materia de
telecomunicaciones y otras disposiciones administrativas;
IV. Acreditar peritos en materia de telecomunicaciones;
V. Establecer procedimientos para homologaci6n de equipos;
VI. Elaborar y mantener actualizado el cuadro nacional de
atribuci6n de frecuencias;
VII. Gestionar la obtencion de las posiciones orbitales
geoestacionarias con sus respectivas bandas de frecuencias,
asi como las orbitas satelitales para satelites mexicanos, y
coordinar su uso y operaci6n con organismos y entidades
internacionales y con otros paises;
VIII. Participar en la negociaci6n de tratados y convenios
internacionales en materia de telecomunicaciones,
considerando, entre otros factores las diferencias existentes
del sector con respecto al de los paises con que se negocie, y
vigilar su observancia;
IX. Adquirir, establecer y operar, en su caso, por si o a traves de
terceros, redes de telecomunicaciones;
X. Promover el fortalecimiento de los valores culturales y de la
identidad nacional;
XI. Promover la investigaci6n y el desarrollo tecnol6gico en
materia de telecomunicaciones, la capacitaci6n y el empleo
de mexicanos cuyas relaciones laborales se sujetaran a la
legislacion de la materia;
XII. Interpretar esta ley para efectos administrativos, y
XIII. Las demos que esta ley y otros ordenamientos legales le
confieran en la materia.
113. Public telegraph services and radiotelegraphs, see id. at art. 9. See also FIL,
D.O., December 27, 1993, art. 5.
114. Under art. 6 of FIL, radio broadcasting and other radio and television services
are excluded from direct foreign investment.
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operating a public telecommunications network in Mexico must
apply with the SCT for a license."5
The FTL is divided into nine chapters setting out the govern-
ment's role in the telecommunications sector to protect the public
interest, assign frequencies, grant licenses, establish regulatory
principles, set the standards for the levy of tariffs, establish the
oversight by the SCT, and set forth the expropriation of telecom-
munications entities during a national crisis.", Chapter 4 of the
FTL establishes new provisions for privatizing the satellite net-
work," 7 in keeping with a 1995 amendment to Article 28 of the
Constitution, which removed satellites from the exclusive control
of the Mexican federal government."1 The Chapters are followed
by a section of transitory provisions.
Under the transitory provisions, foreign competition could
enter the telecommunications market after August 10, 1996. In
addition, long-distance service providers were authorized to begin
operations as of January 1, 1997. Under Article 4 of the provi-
sions, the SCT can issue concessions and permits to third parties
to offer networks and services that had formerly been under the
control of the state. The state, however, would still control teleg-
raphy and radiotelegraphy.1
9
In addition to the promulgation of laws to open foreign compe-
tition in the telecommunications sectors in the 1990's, the govern-
ment also established two executive agencies to monitor and
regulate the anticipated growth in the sector. The Mexican gov-
ernment formed the Federal Competition Commission ("CFC"),
which has oversight over companies that may be engaging in
monopolistic practices, and the Federal Telecommunications Com-
mission ("Cofetel"), which was established under Mexico's Federal
Telecommunications Law of 1995. Also, Cofetel assumed much of
the duties previously assigned to the SCT.
115. FTL, D.O., at art. 24, available at http'//info4.juridicas.unam.mx/ijure/fed/ll4/
default.htm?s= (last visited Dec. 23, 2001).
116. Id. The National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade has an English
translation available for purchase, available at http://www.natlaw.commexico/
topicalIcommunications/stmxcm.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
117. Id. at arts. 55-59.
118. ANA Luz RuELAs, Mtaco Y ESTADOS UNIDOS EN LA REVOLUCION MUNDIAL DE
LAs TELECOMUNICACIONES 233 (1996). According to Ruelas, modification to make the
satellite network non-strategic resulted in protests against the government by both
legislative representatives and academicians.
119. FTL, D.O., at art. 4 (describing transitory provisions).
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V. FEDERAL COMPETITION COMMISSION (CFC)
Established on June 23, 1993, the Federal Competition Com-
mission ("CFC") was tasked with protecting "the competition pro-
cess and free-market access by preventing monopolies,
monopolistic practices and other restrictions that deter the effi-
cient operation of the goods and services markets."12° The ena-
bling legislation for the CFC was the Federal Law on Economic
Competition.' 1 Under Article 35, the CFC was authorized to
bring the following sanctions against business entities determined
to be engaged in monopolistic practices:
I. Order to suspend, correct or eliminate the concentration
practice in question;
II. Order the partial or total de-concentration of what has
been unduly concentrated notwithstanding the applicable
fine, as the case may be;
III. Fine of up to the equivalent of seven thousand times
the general minimum wage in the Federal district for hav-
ing declared falsely or submitting false information to the
Commission, regardless of any criminal liability incurred
therein;
IV. Fine of up to the equivalent of 375 times the general
minimum wage in the Federal district for having incurred
in absolute monopoly practices;
V. Fine for the equivalent of up to 225 times the general
minimum wage in the Federal District, for having engaged
in relative monopoly practices and up to the equivalent of
100 thousand times the general minimum wage in the Fed-
eral District, in the event of the provision under Section 10
of this Law;
VI. Fine up to the equivalent to 225 thousand times the
general minimum wage in the Federal District, for having
incurred in concentrations forbidden by this Law; and a
fine up to the equivalent of 100 thousand times the general
minimum wage in the Federal District for failing to notify a
concentration when it should legally be done; and
VII. Fine up to the equivalent of seven thousand five hun-
dred times the general minimum wage in the Federal Dis-
120. See CFC's Mission Statement, available at http://cfc.gob.mx/cfc99etcomision/
(last visited Dec. 2, 2001).
121. The Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica was enacted December 24, 1992.
Under Article 2, "The purpose of this law is to protect the competition process, and the
free market access, by preventing monopolies, monopolistic practices and other
restrictions that deter the efficient operation of the goods and services market." Ley
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica, December 24, 1992, art. 2 [hereinafter L.C.E.I.
204
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trict to individuals who directly participate in forbidden
monopoly practices or concentrations, on behalf of or on
account of corporations.
In the event of repeated offense, an additional fine may be
assessed up to twice the initial amount.
12
Under Article 37, particularly egregious actions could be
sanctioned by fines "up to ten percent of the annual sales of the
infringer during the previous fiscal year or up to ten percent of the
value of the assets of the infringer, whichever is higher."1 23 Article
38 established that, "the economic agents that have proven to
have suffered damages during the proceeding resulting from the
monopoly practice or illicit concentration, may file a legal claim to
obtain compensation for the damages. In that event, the court
may take into consideration the damages estimated by the
Commission."
1 24
In its first few years of existence, the CFC was rife with politi-
cal corruption; its administrators were fat with money given to
them by power brokers that had close ties to the PRI in order to
keep the CFC out of the business of Mexican big business. 12 The
first chink in the armor of corruption, however, occurred in the
mid-1990's when former President Ernesto Zedillo, himself risk-
ing the ire of his PRI colleagues, moved to prevent Coca-Cola from
taking over Cadbury-Schweppes operations in Mexico. According
to one analyst, "that move effectively froze the soft drink giant's
U.S. $1.85 billion worldwide takeover bid when other countries
followed CFC's lead."2 ' Later, when Vicente Fox came to power in
2000, one of his priorities was to follow through on his pledge to
clean up the government. In doing so, he placed new faces in the
CFC and gave them a regulatory mandate and the independent
authority to move against antitrust violators.
The first bold move against monopolies by the CFC under the
new Fox administration occurred in early 2001 when the agency
prevented Grupo Televisa, the Mexican entertainment and televi-
sion production powerhouse, from buying Mexico's second largest
radio entity, Grupo Acir. 27 In a style not unfamiliar in the world
122. Id. at art. 35.
123. Id. at art. 37.
124. Id. at art. 38.
125. See Camila Castellanos, Trust Buster: Mexico's Federal Competition
Commission Gains Clout-and the Wrath of Big Business-As it Lays Down One Tough
Ruling after Another, Bus. MEX., March 1, 2001, available at LEXIS, News File.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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of Mexican business practices, Televisa retaliated by attempting
to discredit CFC President Fernando Sanchez Ugarte when it ran
news stories alleging that Sanchez "was partial to favoring his
own family's business ties."28 One reporter describes how
Sanchez quickly responded to the attack:
While it would have been easy for Sanchez Ugarte to strike
back personally against the powerful Televisa family, the
CFC head instead rattled off a laundry list of facts about
his family's business and proof of his absence from their
dealings.129
The CFC has also taken steps to dissolve monopolistic prac-
tices among Mexico's consumer products producers and moved to
split up Cintra, the holding company for Mexico's major air carri-
ers, Mexicana and Aeromexico.' 30
When CFC moved against Telmex in 1998, the agency's inten-
tion was to address Telmex's monopolistic and anti-competitive
practices, "such as price fixing and exclusivity agreements, in the
local and long-distance telephone market, as well as the wireless
telephone service sector." 3' In doing so, the CFC was keeping
with one of its stated goals of "[dlefending and promoting Mexico's
interests in the international sphere and avoid monopolistic prac-
tices of international scope,"'32 while promoting another CFC goal
of establishing greater international cooperation by promoting
competition and investment, combating cartels "harmful to con-
sumers and society in general," and reducing "the costs of transac-




The CFC issued a ruling in March 1998 declaring that Telmex
was engaged in monopolistic practices because it was a dominant
carrier in the local and long-distance markets. Upon issuing its
findings and rulings, it then became the job of Cofetel to issue
guidelines to curtail Telmex's monopolistic practices so that its
business practices conformed to the spirit of healthy competition





132. See Fernando Sanchez Ugarte, Annual Encounter on Competition, Federal
Commission on Competition presentation for 2001, at http://cfc.gob.mx/cfc99i/Currentl
index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001).
133. See id.
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VI. FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
("COFETEL")
Cofetel was established by decree"' in 1996 following enact-
ment of the Federal Telecommunications Law of 1995, which
superceded the Law of General Routes of Communications of
1939. Cofetel is an administrative unit of the SCT, but it enjoys
technical and operational autonomy.'35 In 1996, various articles of
the FTL established Cofetel's authority and procedures for regu-
lating tariffs in the telecommunications sector. 3' Cofetel assumed
many of the SCT's regulatory functions. SCT, however, still
remained the main player for issuing government policy, conces-
sions, and permits .1
7
For the first few years of its existence, many considered
Cofetel a toothless tiger that more often than not looked the other
way when Telmex was establishing its domination in the telecom-
munications sector following Mexico's move to open the sector to
market competition.38 Cofetel inherited the SCT's dubious repu-
tation for moving too slowly in order to discourage potential
Telmex competitors and for allowing Telmex to strengthen its
position in the face of oncoming foreign competition." 9 In fact, it is
noted that one former president of Cofetel, Carlos Cassasds, was a
former director of finances at Telmex.
40
Nevertheless, Cofetel did make attempts to curb Telmex's
power by issuing significant rulings. Each time Telmex promptly
responded to these rulings by challenging Cofetel in court. Once
in the court system, Telmex officials knew the cases would not
proceed quickly in a court system prevalent with ineffectiveness,
inefficiency and indifference.' Moreover, Cofetel's dubious repu-
tation as a regulator, and its lack of success in the courts, were
largely due to the political structure of the PRI. For decades,
PRI's structure enabled politicians and businessmen to intrinsi-
134. "Decreto por el que se crea la Comisi6n Federal de Telecomunicaciones," D.O.,
9 de agosto de 1996.
135. HARPER, supra note 64, at 195.
136. "Acuerdo por el que se establece el procedimiento para el registro de tarifas de
los servicios de telecomunicaciones," D. 0., Nov. 15, 1996, specifically following arts.
7, 60, 61, and 64 of the Law., available at http://www.cft.gob.mx/
frame-quienessomos.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Acuerdo].
137. HARPER, supra note 64, at 195.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 195-96.
140. Id. at 196.
141. Smith, supra note 46, at C1.
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cally place their interest in complex relationships, family ties and
mutual endeavors with the ruling class of Mexico in an effort to
acquire wealth and power through the Mexican government.
When opposition candidate Vicente Fox captured the presi-
dency, Mexicans hoped that the new leadership would lead to
widespread changes in the way regulatory agencies conducted
business. President Fox promptly cleaned house at Cofetel and set
out to reestablish independence and accountability within the
agency. Among other things, this meant redefining how the gov-
ernment would deal with the depredations of Telmex in the busi-
ness world. The challenge to the government, however, is that
Telmex is less a corporate entity and more the strong personality
of Telmex chairman, Carlos Slim. Slim is Mexico's wealthiest and
arguably Mexico's most tenacious businessman. Slim's influence
runs deep in the fabric of Mexican politics and the country's finan-
cial sector.
Fox's first attempts to reign in Telmex through Cofetel
occurred in early 2000. In keeping with its new executive man-
date, Cofetel declared that Telmex was a dominant carrier in sev-
eral telecommunications markets, including local and long-
distance service. 142 As a result, Cofetel levied a ten million-peso
fine against Telmex and moved to establish a regulatory strategy
for Telmex under the terms of the Telecommunication Act.
Telmex immediately took Cofetel to court, seeking an injunction to
prevent the regulations from taking effect and arguing that the
rate scheme and other regulations established by Cofetel violated
the terms of Telmex's operating license.
14
On September 11, 2000, Cofetel issued new rules intended to
prevent Telmex from engaging in monopolistic practices. While
comprehensive in scope, the rules, if enforced, would "prevent the
operator from charging different rates for local services in diverse
areas within the country."144 Also, the regulation would stabilize
unit rates and prevent Telmex from blocking competitor operators
from access to the Telmex network. The regulations would be
effective until 2003, at which time Telmex would be allowed to
apply to Cofetel for changes to its service rates.'45
142. Case, supra note 4, at IF.
143. Telmex Future Seen Hinging On Court Rulings, REFORMA, May 3, 2001,
available at LEXIS, News File.
144. Telmex Loses Its Grip on Power, BROADBAND NETWORKING NEWS, Sept. 26,
2000, available at LEXIS, News File.
145. Shetty, supra note 2, at 48.
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The Cofetel regulations were "designed to prohibit Telmex
from charging lower rates in densely populated urban areas where
there is likely to be competition."'46 Cofetel also sought to prevent
Telmex from undercutting the service rates of its competitors in
order to "squeeze the margins of its competitors in the areas
where there is competition and ... higher margins in the rest of
the country.""' In addition, Telmex was ordered by Cofetel to
"provide quality billing and collection services, fast service to com-
petitors seeking interconnection and accurate technical data
regarding the basic elements of the network to ensure adequate
interoperability of interconnected public networks as well as to
allow unbundled access."14
Telmex would, however, be allowed to raise rates before 2003,
but only if the rates were the same across the board in every Mexi-
can state.149 The regulations, according to Cofetel President, Jorge
Nicolin, were also designed to prevent Telmex "from charging dif-
ferent local rates in the five markets-local, domestic long-dis-
tance, international calls, interurban access and local carrier
services."'
As for the competition, the rules would prevent Telmex from
arbitrarily charging other service providers more than it costs
Telmex to provide connections to the providers.' 5' According to
one analyst, however, "the rules [were] based on Telmex's costs,
which is problematic, as it gives the operator an incentive to
inflate its costs in the future." '52
Other regulations promulgated by Cofetel included:
" Lowering access fees for service providers using the Telmex
network from an average of 3.2 cents per minute to about 1
cent per minute;
" Introducing quality of service indices to monitor Telmex on
a region-to-region basis, offering the same quality of service
to its competitors as it offers to its own subsidiaries, includ-
ing billing and collection services;
" Using a single service provisioning system based on "first
come, first served" process, for both internal and external
customers;
146. See generally Telmex Loses Its Grip on Power, supra note 144.
147. Id.
148. Shetty, supra note 2, at 48.
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" Cofetel and a third party will have real-time access to this
provisioning system;
* Telmex will have to allow unbundled access to its services,
capacity and network functions. 5 '
Telmex's competitors cautiously praised the Cofetel regula-
tions pending review of the enforceability of the rules, after ini-
tially complaining that the regulations against Telmex did not go
far enough."' What Cofetel did not address in its rules were con-
tinuing disputes over "future interconnection rates, past due pay-
ments, WTO resolution and proportionate returns."155 Moreover,
despite the Fox administration's goal to give Cofetel legal due pro-
cess, the regulator still lacks the legal and autonomous authority
to enforce its rulings, including the power to "impose tougher rules
on incumbents and enjoy fixed terms for commissioners."156 In the
words of Cofetel's Nicolin, the regulatory agency needs "a big fat
stick."157
VII. IMPACT OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT ("NAFTA") ON THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
Applying NAFTA trade provisions to the telecommunications
sector was a high priority for the Mexican government as early as
1988, when the Salinas administration set about to privatize some
of its struggling government-controlled industries in the face of a
growing economic crisis. The Mexican government considered
Telmex as Mexico's crown jewel. By signing onto NAFTA, the
Mexican government was in part hoping to buy time for Telmex by
shielding it from the onslaught of foreign competition into the
telecommunications marketplace, at least until such time that
Telmex could adequately confront challengers in the market
place.' 8 Furthermore, the government had agreements to honor
with Telmex's new ownership under a joint venture arrangement
headed up by Carlos Slim and other Mexican businessmen with
close ties to the ruling PRI by protecting its monopoly of certain




156. Shetty, supra note 2, at 48.
157. Id.
158. Ivan H. Shefrin, The North American Free Trade Agreement:
Telecommunications in Perspective, 17 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y 14, 17 (1993).
159. Id.
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With the passage of NAFTA, the inertia toward privatization
was placed permanently in motion.16 NAFTA not only opened the
Mexican market per se, but the telecommunications sector, specif-
ically, was finally exposed to the influence of market competition
and consumer choice. Essentially, NAFTA allowed the camel's
nose under the tent for competitors waiting on the sidelines of the
Mexican telecommunications sector. Moreover, foreign investors
could now control certain enterprises that prior to NAFTA were
completely prohibited to non-Mexicans. "NAFTA reversed
decades of Mexican foreign policy to the extent that it forbids any
party to require the maintenance of minimum levels of equity held
by nationals of the country."'"' NAFTA also allowed the transfer
across borders of monetary gains made in Mexico.162
The provisions for telecommunications under NAFTA are set
out in lengthy detail in Chapter XIII of the treaty. NAFTA
presented a significant challenge for the Mexican government,
because if the PRI wanted to play with the "big boys" it had to
implement liberalized policies, which in many regards went
against the thinking of the PRI's long domination over the affairs
and policies of the nation. Whereas the telecommunications mar-
kets of the United States and Canada had long been driven by
liberalization policies, Mexico's telecommunications sector was
driven by protectionist legislation and regulation. Indeed,
NAFTA's telecommunications provisions were quite alien to Mex-
ico's provisions because the focus of the trade agreement was first
and foremost to open the Mexican telecommunications market to
foreign participation. Mexico wanted and needed NAFTA badly if
the nation was to overcome the cyclical economic downturns
caused by the nation's reliance on its oil industry. The changes
the Mexican government made to its Constitution and many of its
laws in regard to its telecommunications sector in order to "get"
NAFTA are said by some to have constituted a telecommunica-
tions revolution.
163
Mexico relinquished much in order to gain much. For
instance, NAFTA's section on the national treatment for invest-
ments effectively prevented the Mexican government from
regressing to its former nationalistic tendencies by requiring that
160. Zahralddin & Jones, supra note 8, at 916.
161. Id. at 917.
162. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art.
1109, 32 I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter NAFTA]. Spanish version available at http:/!
www.natlaw.com/treatiesftlc/tlcd.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2002).
163. Zahralddin & Jones, supra note 8, at 920.
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the NAFTA signatories treat foreign investors as they will treat
their own citizens.164 NAFTA also established procedural safe-
guards for foreign companies trying to compete in the Mexican
market that were intended to prevent discrimination by dominant
national entities.
As monopolies characterized much of Mexico's big business
throughout the century, the government had to tread carefully
toward compliance with the NAFTA provisions regarding monopo-
lies. Under Article 1305, a country may allow a monopoly pro-
vider of public networks or services.'65 It does, however, require
that the country protect against the abuse of a monopoly power.
When the United States Trade Representative, Barshefsky,
finally became actively involved in the telecommunications dis-
pute between Telmex and its U.S.-backed competitors, a primary
contention was that Mexico had utterly failed to prevent this
monopolistic abuse.
Under NAFTA, access to networks and services must be pro-
vided under the two standards of reasonableness and non-discrim-
ination. This implies that signatories treat foreign competitors
the same as domestic entities are treated.'66 "National treatment
still allows heavy restrictions to be placed on foreign industry so
long as the same restrictions are placed on domestic industry."" '
The entity interested in the use of the public networks and ser-
vices must not be hindered from leasing or buying private lines,
constructing a telecommunications infrastructure, and accessing
the dominant entity's network in order to conduct business." 8 The
operation and provision of public networks and services, however,
are not subject to NAFTA 69
In order to achieve parity, or at least a balanced playing field
in the market place, certain monopolistic abuses had to be cur-
164. NAFTA, art. 1102.
165. NAFTA art. 1305.
166. Richard McKenna, The Challenge of Assuring Universal Service in a
Competitive Environment: What the Experience of the United States Might Suggest to
Mexico, 3-WTR NAFTA: L. & Bus. REv. AM. 5, 16 (1997).
167. Id.
168. NAFTA art. 1302. See also, Stephen I. Glover and JoEllen Lotvedt, The
Mexican Telecommunications Market: The Interplay of Internal Reform and NAFTA,
3-WTR NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 23, 35 (1997).
169. Glover & Lotvedt, supra note 168, at 35. The authors cite as an example that
"NAFTA doesn't require member countries to provide public network access if public
networks do not exist, nor does it require that member countries make private
networks available for public access and use." Id.
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tailed;7 ° in particular, "engaging in anticompetitive conduct
adversely affecting entities of another NAFTA member in [a] mar-
ket segment not sheltered by the government's monopoly." 7'
Other conduct discouraged under the provisions could include
"cross-subsidization, predatory conduct and the discriminatory
provision of access to public telecommunications transport net-
works or services."172 The restrictions extrapolated under Article
1305 should have prohibited Telmex from misusing its monopoly
privileges. The fact that the Mexican government appears to have
made no challenge to Telmex's behavior covered under this provi-
sion became a major issue in the dispute between Telmex and its
foreign competitors, which eventually led to charges brought
against the Mexican government before the World Trade
Organization.
VIII. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND ITS ROLE IN
RESOLVING TRADE DISPUTES
The World Trade Organization ("WTO")' 3 is an international
treaty opened for signature April 15, 1994 and entered into force
January 1, 1995.114 The WTO Agreement is actually a collection of
individual trade-related treaties that were negotiated together.
One of these agreements, known as the "Marrakesh Agreement,"
instituted what became the World Trade Organization. Today,
the WTO has replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") as being the main organization dealing with
intergovernmental trade relations at the international level.' v5
170. NAFTA, art. 1305.
171. Zahralddin & Jones, supra note 8, at 928-29.
172. NAFTA art. 1305.
173. See the WTO web page at http://www.wto.org (last visited Jan. 17, 2002).
174. See Marrakesh Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867-9 U.N.T.S. 1 and 1867
U.N.T.S. 154. See also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr.15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1125 and 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter GATT].
175. GATT opened for signature on October 30, 1947, and entered into force
provisionally on January 1, 1948. Participants in GATT's discussions negotiated the
agreement as a temporary measure to promote and guard tariff reductions. See
Proposal of Provisional Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Oct. 30 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 308. The WTO, as a permanent institution, overcame the
temporality status of GATT to embody a permanent, proper institutional framework
with detailed rules. For an excellent discussion on the evolution of GATT and WTO,
see Jeffrey Waincymer, Transparency Of Dispute Settlement Within The World Trade
Organization, 24 MELB. U. L. REv. 797, 798 (2000).
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A) WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
The WTO is the primary body for resolving international
trade disputes between members. The dispute settlement system
developed from a combination of Article 23 of the 1994 GATT,
some provisions pertaining to the specialized agreements " 6 and
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes ("DSU")."' According to Article 3 of the DSU,
"the dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading
system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the
rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements,
and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accor-
dance with customary rules of interpretation of public interna-
tional law."7"
The DSU sets forth the mechanisms and procedures for dis-
pute settlement. The WTO's General Council functions as a sepa-
rate Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") to administer all stages of
the process. The first phase entails consultation between the dis-
puting parties.'79 The complaining party may request the conven-
ing of a dispute resolution panel if consultation fails within 60
days after the date of receipt of the request for consultation. 80 If
there is no agreement on the selection of panelists, the Director
General in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the
Chairman of the relevant committee selects the panelists.'81 The
panel hears written and oral arguments from the parties and
third-party members who have signified an interest in the mat-
176. Some of these provisions are: Agreement on Agriculture, art. 19, 1867 U.N.T.S.
410; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art. 11,
1867 U.N.T.S. 493; Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, art. 8 (10), 1868 U.N.T.S. 14;
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, art. 14; Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), art. 8, 1869 UNTS 299; Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
art. 17, 1868 UNTS 201; Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, art 8, 1868 UNTS
368; Agreement on Rules of Origin, art. 8, 1868 UNTS 397; Agreement on Import
Licensing Procedures, art. 6, 1868 UNTS 436; Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, art. 30, 1869 UNTS 14; Agreement on Safeguards, art. 14,
1869 UNTS 154; General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. 23; 1869 UNTS 183;
and, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
art. 63, 1869 UNTS 299.
177. See ATT, art. 3, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1125.
178. Id.
179. See GATT, art. 4(2), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 ILM 1226.
180. See GATT, art. 4(7), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 ILM 1226.
181. See GATT, art. 8(7), 1869 UNTS 401, 33 ILM 1226,1232.
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ter."' The panel sets deadlines for written submission by the par-
ties.'83 Following consideration of the rebuttal submissions and
oral arguments, the panel issues descriptive sections (factual and
argument) of its draft report to the parties. The parties then sub-
mit comments in writing within the time set by the panel. The
panel issues an interim report, including the descriptive sections
and the findings and conclusions. If no comments are received
from any party within the comment period, the interim report
becomes the final report and is circulated to the members.' The
final report is then adopted at the DSB meeting if the parties give
no formal notification to the DSB of their desire to appeal. The
DSB may also decide by consensus not to adopt the report.185 An
appellate body formed by the DSB hears appeals from panel cases.
Only parties to the dispute can appeal a panel report. The appeal
is limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal
interpretations developed by the panel.186
The WTO and the Telecommunications Sector
The WTO also has its own agreement regarding the telecom-
munications sector, called the WTO Telecom Agreement, which
went into effect February 5, 1998.187 The Telecom Agreement is an
attempt to aid signatories in determining "if reciprocal competi-
tive opportunities exist in foreign markets"88 for expanding basic
telecommunications services, including "local, long-distance and
international voice and data transmission service."18 9 The agree-
ment represents the first multilateral telecommunications agree-
ment ever reached. The Agreement encompasses seventy-seven
countries that "comprise the world's major telecom service mar-
kets and account for more than ninety percent of world telecom
182. See GATT, app 3, arts 4-6, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 ILM 1226, 1245.
183. See GATT, art. 12 (5), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 1.L.M. 1126,1233.
184. See GATT, art. 15 (1) (2), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1126, 1235.
185. See GATT, art. 16(4), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1126, 1235.
186. GATT, art. 17, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1126,1236.
187. See http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/International /NewsReleases/19981
nrin8001.txt (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
188. Krista Schwarting Rose, Note, Changing Frequencies: The Federal
Communications Commission Globalizes the Telecommunications Industry with the
Adoption of the WTO Agreements, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 161, 190 (1999).
189. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Office of Telecommunications Technologies, WTO:
Q's & A's on the Basic Telecommunications Services Agreement, Dec. 22, 1999,
a vz ilczble czt http://infoserv2.ita.doc.gov/ot/home.nsf/
504ca249c786e20f85256284006da7ab/
15186ade3990859b852565a300221791!OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 14, 2002).
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revenues."9 " Countries are to open monopoly markets to competi-
tion by pledging to a set of regulatory principles and making
explicit commitments to open their telecommunications services
markets. Measures to open markets include access to public tele-
communications transport networks of existing suppliers "under
non-discriminatory terms and at cost-oriented rates. These non-
discriminatory terms include a competitive provider's technical
ability to interconnect to the public network using standardized,
open interfaces." 191
B) Telecommunications Integration into the General
Agreement on Trade in Services
The Telecommunications Integration into the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services ("GATS") came about in conjunction
with the creation of the WTO.9 2 Under the GATS, trade in ser-
vices was brought within the international trading regime created
for trade in goods by the GATT. The GATS set forth the general
obligations and disciplines members must follow. It also contains
Members Schedules, a listing of commitments in specific services
areas each country agrees to under the GATS.
Undertaking a specific service commitment on a Member
Schedule constitutes an agreement "to provide market access and
national treatment for service activity in question on the terms
and conditions specified in the schedule."" 3 By placing a specific
service on the schedule, the Member government commits itself to
"the specified level of market access and national treatment and
undertakes not to impose any new measures that would restrict
entry into the market or the operation of the service. " " In order
to see which services sectors and what conditions the basic princi-
ples of the GATS apply within a country's jurisdiction, one must
refer to that country's schedule and its Most Favored Nation
190. Id.
191. See Telecommunications Industry Association Report, WTO Agreement on
Basic Telecommunications Services, available at http://www.tiaonline.org/
international/globalwto/wto.agreement.cfin (last visited Jan. 14, 2002).
192. See GATS, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO,
Annex 1B, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The
Legal Texts 325 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994).
193. See World Trade Organization, Guide to Reading the GATS Schedule of
Specific Commitments and List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, available at http://
www.wto.orgenglish/tratop-e/serv-e/guidel-e.htm> (last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
194. See id.
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("MFN") exemption list.195 In the case of Mexico, its Member
Schedule includes telecommunications as one of its commitments
under the GATS,'96 but also specifies in the schedule some limita-
tions that Mexico maintains on market access.
197
The GATS imposes some essential obligations and commit-
ments on all WTO members. ' One of the most important obliga-
tions is MFN treatment to services providers from other WTO
members, in spite of the commitments assumed by any individual
member. 19 9 Accordingly, a WTO member is precluded from dis-
criminating among other members. Additionally, WTO members
assume transparency obligations whereby member countries must
promptly make public all laws and regulations affecting trade and
services. °0 Transparency promotes stability and predictability
since service suppliers know the rules under which they can do
business.
Market access is another critical obligation imposed by the
GATS. WTO members are to refrain from imposing certain types
of quotas and other quantitative restrictions, or local incorpora-
tion requirements, in services sectors listed by the members in
their GATS schedules.201 Under the national treatment tenet,
WTO members are precluded from treating foreign services, or
service providers, differently than national services or service
providers. The application of the market access provision and
national treatment are subject to negotiation on a sector-by-sector
basis. °2 Handling of domestic and foreign service suppliers under
195. The basic principles of GATS are market access, national treatment and Most
Favored Nation (MFN) treatment.
196. See World Trade Organization, GATS Commitments on Telecommunications,
available at http://www.wto.org/englisltratop-e/servte-e/tel08-e.htm (last visited
Jan. 20, 2002).
197. Some of the limitations Mexico identifies are: the international traffic must go
through installations of a company with concessions issued by the Secretariat of
Communications and Transportation; only companies constituted under Mexican
laws can obtain concessions; foreign governments can not participate in a company
formed under the Mexican laws and cannot obtain authorization to offer
telecommunication services; foreign investment in a Mexican company is allowed only
up to 49 percent. See Organizaci6n Mundial del Comercio: Comercio de Servicios,
Mexico, GATS/SC/56/Suppl.2, April 11, 1997, available at http://www.wto.org/englishl
tratope/servtee/gbtoff e.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
198. See GATS, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1B, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: The Legal Texts 325 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994).
199. GATS art. I, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1169 (1994).
200. See GATS art. III, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1170 (1994).
201. See GATS art. XV, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1179 (1994).
202. According to GATS Article XX, each WTO member negotiates a schedule of
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the GATS national treatment and MFN need not be identical to
accord MFN or national treatment. The vital aspect of a MFN or
national treatment scrutiny is "whether the treatment accorded
modifies the conditions of competition in favor of certain foreign or
domestic suppliers. Thus, dissimilar treatment can be consistent
with MFN or national treatment obligations if it does not put the
foreign supplier at a competitive disadvantage to another foreign
supplier or a domestic supplier.""'
C) Telecommunications Under GATS
Globalization, the desire to become -more competitive in the
market, and the need for fast and reliable fields of communica-
tions, pressures many countries to consider opening their borders
to various services excluded under the GATS. One of the service
sectors left unsettled has been basic telecommunications
services .
204
At the creation of the WTO in 1994, WTO members pledged to
allow market access for a wide variety of services including the
telecommunications services. The importance of this service was
highlighted by the creation of a separate sector-specific negotia-
tion scheduled to conclude by April 30, 1996. This deadline was
extended to February 15, 1997 due to the insufficient progress
made.205 This extended negotiation in turn produced the February
Accord.
206
Several countries undertook additional specific commitments
as a result of the negotiations;27 specifically, market access com-
commitments dealing with the various services sectors. A member must list
quantitative restrictions and discriminations in favor of domestic industries that the
country wishes to maintain, if the country agrees to make market access
commitments in any particular service. Under GATS Article XIX, that discrimination
is put through negotiations during the original negotiations or subsequent rounds.
See GATS III, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1181 (1994).
203. Lawrence J. Spiwak, From International Competitive Carrier to the WTO: A
Survey of the FCC's International Telecommunications Policy Initiatives 1985-1998,
51 FED. Comm. L.J. 111, 169 (1998).
204. Kenneth Freiberg, World Trade Organizations: Second Protocol to the General
Agreement on Trading in Services (GATS) and Related Decisions, 35 I.L.M. 199
(1996); Introductory Note to the Second Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade
in Services.
205. During the negotiations countries had many sharp confrontations on this
important issue. For an extensive report on this political topic, see generally CYNTIA
A. BELTZ, TliE BORDERLESS ECONoMY: GLOBAL TRADE RULES AND THE INTERNET
(1999).
206. Spiwak, supra note 203, at 169.
207. See GATS, art. 18, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1180 (1994).
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mitments in basic telecommunications services. This action also
subjected these countries to the GATS requirements relating to
domestic regulation of the services included in Article VI. Under
this article, domestic regulation must be "administered in a rea-
sonable, objective and impartial manner."08 The commitments
undertaken are included in the Reference Paper of February 15,
1997 which are in favor of competitive regulatory principles. 9
D) The Reference Paper
The Reference Paper created within the 1997 Basic Telecom-
munications Agreement ("BTA") established a broad range of "pro-
competitive" market access commitments for services in the tele-
communications industry service sector. 10 The Reference Paper
contains six sections. Under Section 1, WTO members are com-
mitted to preventing anti-competitive practices in telecommunica-
tions by instituting, "competitive safeguards." The Paper
describes the following as anti-competitive practices:
(a) engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization;
(b) using information obtained from competitors with anti-
competitive results;
(c) not making available to other services suppliers on a
timely basis technical information about essential facili-
ties and commercially relevant information which are nec-
essary for them to provide services.211
According to Section 2, interconnection with a major supplier is
provided:
(a) under non-discriminatory terms, conditions (including
technical standards and specifications) and rates and of a
quality no less favorable than that provided for its own
like services or for like services of non- affiliated service
suppliers or for its subsidiaries or other affiliates;
(b) in a timely fashion, on terms, conditions (including techni-
cal standards and specifications) and cost-oriented rates
that are transparent, reasonable, having regard to eco-
nomic feasibility, and sufficiently unbundled so that the
208. See GATS, art. 6, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1146 (1994), para.1.
209. See Laura B. Sherman, World Trade Organization: Agreement of
Telecommunications Services (Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in
Services) 36 I.L.M. 354, 367 (1997).
210. See id.
211. Id.
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supplier need not pay for network components or facilities
that it does not require for the service to be provided; and
(c) upon request, at points in addition to the network termi-
nation points offered to the majority of users, subject to
charges that reflect the cost of construction of necessary
additional facilities.212
Moreover, the Paper requires major suppliers to make pub-
licly available, "procedures applicable for interconnection"1 3 and
"its interconnection agreements or a reference interconnection
offer."2 14 The Paper also contains its own section for dispute set-
tlement"5 and establishes the right of members to define the type
of universal service obligation they wish to maintain. According
to the Paper, those obligations are not anti-competitive per se if
"they are administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and
competitively neutral manner and are not more burdensome than
necessary for the kind of universal service defined by the Mem-
ber."216 If a license is required, the Paper expects publicity on the
terms and conditions of individual licenses within the time
required to decide on the license. The regulatory body is required
to be independent and impartial.
217
Among the schedule of services commitments Mexico submit-
ted to the WTO was a commitment to the Reference Paper on reg-
ulatory principles.2 18 Like the GATT tariff schedules on goods, the
services commitments to provide specified levels of access to trade
in each Member's market are an integral and legally binding com-
ponent of the Agreement.
219
E) February Accord: Basic Telecommunications
Agreement ("BTA")
The February Accord is not a regulatory agreement; it is a





217. See Sherman, supra note 209, at 369.
218. See World Trade Organization, Highlights of Commitments and MF.N.
Exemptions Resulting from the Negotiations, available at http://www.wto.org/englishl
tratop_e/servte_etel13_e.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Highlights of
Commitments].
219. See World Trade Organization, Schedules of Specific Commitments, available
at http:l/www.wto.orgfenglish/tratop-e/servte-e/telO6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 21,
2002).
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trade agreement that entered into force on January 1, 1998.220
This agreement became the fourth protocol, and was accepted by
the Mexican government.2 Moreover, the Mexican government
committed to improvements in "raising the foreign equity limita-
tion to forty-nine percent for all telecommunications service sup-
pliers (from the forty percent listed in an earlier revision) and
ending the exclusivity of regional duopolies in cellular teleph-
ony."2 2 The Mexican government also committed "to competition
in all market segments of public telecommunications services on a
facilities and a resale basis."223 The segments included voice tele-
phone services, data transmission, private leased circuit services,
paging and certain cellular telephone services.2 Foreign invest-
ment in excess of forty-nine percent for cellular telephony would
be allowed, subject to prior government authorization. Finally,
the Mexican government also committed to the Reference Paper
on regulatory principles.22' All are binding responsibilities under-
taken by the Mexican government, which were to be "progres-
sively expanded and liberalized."226
The BTA has unparalleled bearing in opening basic telecom-
munications markets to worldwide competition and encouraging
deregulation of the telecommunication industry globally.227 The
parties to this agreement commit themselves to opening their
basic telecommunications market to competition by providing a
viable regulatory environment, and to allow foreign ownership
and control of entities providing telecommunications services. As
a party to the BTA, Mexico agreed to comply with these pro-com-
petition regulatory principles.228
The BTA also covers "basic telecommunications," a term of art
that includes international services, local and long distance ser-
220. See Sherman, supra note 209, at 369.
221. See World Trade Organization, Status of Acceptances of the Fourth Protocol to
the General Agreement on Trade in Services, available at http'//www.wto.orgenglish/
tratop-e/servte e/telpro4_e.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).





227. See Sherman, supra note 209, at 366.
228. Following its adoption in 1998 and even though not all WTO members have
signed on to the BTA, the Agreement successfully opened 95 percent of the world
telecommunications market to competition and coverage "of nearly one trillion in
telecommunications trade." See also Charlene Barshefsky, Information Technology
and Trade Policy: A Look Back, A Look Ahead (June 5, 2000) available at http://
www.ustr.gov/speech-test/barshefsky/barshefsky_90.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2002).
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vices for public and non-public uses, and services that are accessi-
ble through any technology (cable, wireless, or satellite), on a
facilities or resale basis.2 9 Specific technologies included in basic
service were to be outlined in Mexico's schedule as an itemized
compilation of trade terms that countries filed with the WTO and
agreed to maintain.23 °
F) Reason for the U.S.-Mexico Dispute Being in the
WTO
The agreement is fully enforceable under the WTO dispute
mechanism to those who commit to be bound by its principles.
13'
Mexico's behavior seems to show that as a WTO member, it has
failed to fulfill its commitments under the Reference Paper and
the BTA.ms The United States can then enforce those commit-
ments through the WTO's dispute settlement process. Were the
United States to prevail, the remedies available to it would
include, first and foremost, an obligation by Mexico to fulfill its
market access commitments or implement the necessary regula-
tory principles. If Mexico fails to fulfill its commitment, it must
then compensate the United States in trade terms.
IX. THE UNITED STATES AND THE MEXICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
When the Mexican government opened the telecommunica-
tions sector to foreign competition in 1997, U.S.-based telecom
companies were quick to respond by entering into joint ventures
with Mexican entrepreneurs and emerging Telmex competitors.
The United States government's "point person" for promoting
United States interests in foreign markets is the Office of the
United States Trade Representative ("USTR"). The USTR draws
much of its authority to act on behalf of United States companies
from the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.3'
229. See Sherman, supra note 209, at 367, 371.
230. See id. at 371. Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Note by the
Chairman, Revision, Notes for Scheduling Basic Telecom Services Commitments, S1
GBT/W/2IRev.1 (Jan. 16, 1997).
231. Reference Paper of the Basic Telecommunications Agreement. See also
Spiwak, supra note 203, at 169.
232. See Mexico, Schedule of Commitments and Lists of Article II Exemptions,
available at http://www/wto.orglenglishltratop-eservteOegbtof-e.htm.
233. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,§ 1, 102
Stat. 1107,1107 (1988); codified at 19 U.S.C. sec. 3101 et seq.
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A) Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
Section 1371 et seq., known as the Telecommunications Trade
Act of 1988, established the protocols by which the United States
Trade Representative would pursue the export of telecommunica-
tions products with the goal of establishing an open world market
for United States telecommunications products. Even in 1988,
Congress recognized that "most foreign markets for telecommuni-
cations products, services, and investment are characterized by
extensive government intervention (including restrictive import
practices and discriminatory procurement practices) which
adversely affect United States exports of telecommunications
products and services and United States investment in
telecommunications. "234
Congress also recognized the need to establish a domestic pol-
icy that would offset a growing trade imbalance due to a liberali-
zation of the domestic marketplace,235 while at the same time
creating "mutually advantageous opportunities for trade in tele-
communications products and services between the United States
and foreign countries."2 6 If such parity could not be achieved, the
United States would move to "avoid granting continued open
access to the telecommunications products and services of such
foreign countries in the United States market. 2 37 Moreover, the
Congress acknowledged that:
The unique business conditions in the worldwide market
for telecommunications products and services caused by the
combination of deregulation and divestiture in the United
States, which represents a unilateral liberalizations of
United States trade with the rest of the world, and continu-
ing government intervention in the domestic industries of
many other countries create a need to make an exception in
the case of telecommunications products and services that
should not necessarily be a precedent for legislating specific
sectoral priorities in combating the closed markets or
unfair foreign trade practices of other countries."3
The intended purpose of the Act was to focus efforts by the
United States to level the playing field in the telecommunications
234. Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1372(a)(3), 102
Stat. 1216, 1216-17 (1988) [hereinafter Telecommunications Trade Act].
235. Id. at § 1372(a)(4).
236. Id. at § 1372(a)(5).
237. Id.
238. Id. at § 1372(a)(6).
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sector, which in 1988 was entering a new era of technological
innovation and growth.
Specifically, the Act was meant:
(1) to foster the economic and technological growth of, and
employment in, the United States telecommunications
industry;
(2) to secure a high quality telecommunications network for
the benefit of the people of the United States;
(3) to develop an international consensus in favor of open
trade and competition in telecommunications products
and services;
(4) to ensure that countries which have made commitments
to open telecommunications trade fully abide by those
commitments; and
(5) to achieve a more open world trading system for telecom-
munications products and services through negotiation
and provision of mutually advantageous market opportu-
nities for United States telecommunications exporters
and their subsidiaries in those markets in which barriers
exist to free international trade.239
The task Congress assigned to the USTR under the Act was a
clear mandate that the investigation of foreign telecommunica-
tions trade barriers and the resolution of the challenges in the
telecommunications sector were to be given a high priority. The
marching orders for the USTR under the Act were as follows:
The Trade Representative shall conduct an investigation to
identify priority foreign countries. Such investigation shall be
conducted no later than the date that is 5 months after the
date of enactment of this Act.24
The investigation by the Trade Representative was to focus on:
1. the nature and significance of the acts, policies, and prac-
tices that deny mutually advantageous market opportuni-
ties to telecommunications products and services of United
States firms;
2. the economic benefits (actual and potential) accruing to
foreign firms from open access to the United States mar-
ket; telecommunications products and services of United
States firms;
3. the potential size of the market of a foreign country for
239. Id. at § 1372(b).
240. Id. at § 1374(a).
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telecommunications products and services of United States
firms;
4. the potential to increase United States exports of telecom-
munications products and services, either directly or
through the establishment of a beneficial precedent; and
5. measurable progress being made to eliminate the objec-
tionable acts, policies, or practices.
24'
Were the USTR to determine that targeted countries were
impeding trade in the telecommunications sector, Congress
authorized the USTR to take steps against any foreign country
determined to be conducting unfair trade practices in the telecom-
munications sector.242 The findings of the USTR were to be sub-
mitted in a report to the Congress no later than "30 days after the
date on which the investigation conducted under subsection (a) is
completed."24
The Act further set out the general and specific agendas to
follow for negotiating with countries found to be engaging in
unfair trade practices:
The general negotiating objectives of the United States under
this section are-
(1) to obtain multilateral or bilateral agreements (or the mod-
ification of existing agreements) that provide mutually
advantageous market opportunities for trade in telecom-
munications products and services between the United
States and foreign countries;
(2) to correct the imbalances in market opportunities accru-
ing from reductions in barriers to the access of telecom-
munications products and services of foreign firms to the
United States market; and
(3) to facilitate the increase in United States exports of tele-
communications products and services to a level of exports
that reflects the competitiveness of the United States tele-
communications industry.2
The specific negotiating objectives of the United States under
241. Telecommunications Trade Act, § 1374(b), 102 Stat. 1216, 1218.
242. Under the Telecommunications Trade Act § 1374(c)(1), the trade
representative may at any time, after taking into account the factors described in
subsection (b)((A) revoke the identification of any priority foreign country that was
made under this section, or (B) identify any foreign country as a priority foreign
country under this section, if information available to the trade representative
indicated that such action is appropriate.
243. Id. at § 1374(d).
244. Telecommunications Trade Act, § 1375(c), 102 Stat. 1216, 1219.
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this section regarding telecommunications products and services
are to obtain-
(1) national treatment for telecommunications products and
services that are provided by United States firms;
(2) most-favored-nation treatment for such products and
services;
(3) nondiscriminatory procurement policies with respect to
such products and services and the inclusion under the
Agreement on Government Procurement of the procure-
ment (by sale or lease by government-owned or con-
trolled entities) of all telecommunications products and
services
(4) the reduction or elimination of customs duties on tele-
communications products;
(5) the elimination of subsidies, violations of intellectual
property rights, and other unfair trade practices that
distort international trade in telecommunications prod-
ucts and services;
(6) the elimination of investment barriers that restrict the
establishment of foreign-owned business entities which
market such products and services;
(7) assurances that any requirement for the registration of
telecommunications products, which are to be located on
customer premises, for the purposes of
(A) attachment to a telecommunications network in a
foreign country, and
(B) the marketing of the products in a foreign country,
be limited to the certification by the manufacturer
that the products meet the standards established by
the foreign country
(8) transparency or, and open participation in, the stan-
dards-setting processes used in foreign countries with
respect to telecommunications products;
(9) the ability to have telecommunications products, which
are to be located on customer premises, approved and
registered by type, and, if appropriate, the establishment
of procedures between the United States and foreign
countries for the mutual recognition of type approvals;
(10) access to the basic telecommunications network in for-
eign countries on reasonable and nondiscriminatory
terms and conditions (including nondiscriminatory
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prices) for the provision of value-added services by
United States suppliers;
(11) the nondiscriminatory procurement of telecommunica-
tions products and services by foreign entities that pro-
vide local exchange telecommunications services which
are owned, controlled, or, if appropriate, regulated by
foreign governments; and
(12) monitoring and effective dispute settlement mechanisms
to facilitate compliance with matters referred to in the
preceding paragraphs of this subsection.24
The time period set for negotiation with foreign countries to
resolve trade disputes in the telecommunications sector was
established at one year from the date on which identification of
the foreign country was made.246 If little or no improvement
resulted from negotiations, Congress extended authority to the
President to take appropriate punitive actions. Such actions
included, "termination, withdrawal, or suspension of any portion
of any trade act entered into with such country"247 under various
United States trade acts, to prohibit the federal government from
purchasing telecommunications products from such country,",
and to establish other penalties under the law involving suspen-
sion of business between the United States and the foreign
country.249
Furthermore, the conditions established under the Act set the
foundation upon which the United States would pursue sanctions
and punitive actions against Telmex before the WTO when, in the
1990s, the trade dispute over access to the telecommunications
markets in Mexico became a front-burner issue for the USTR.
X. THE USTR ISSUES WITH TELMEX
The USTR has identified a number of key issues with regard
to the Telmex monopoly in the Mexican telecommunications sec-
tor. The first concerns the interconnection fees Telmex charges
United States long distance carriers for completing calls originat-
ing in the United States. The international connection traffic
between the United States and Mexico is the highest in the world
245. Telecommunications Trade Act, § 1375(d), 102 Stat. 1216, 1219-20.
246. Telecommunications Trade Act, § 1376(c)(1)(B), 102 Stat. 1216, 1220-21. The
period from the date of enactment of the Act was set at 18 months (sec. 1736(c)(1)(A)).
247. Id. at § 1376(b)(1)(A).
248. Id. at § 1376(b)(1)(C).
249. See id. at § 1376(b)(1), subsections (D) through (G).
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and worth billions annually in revenues to the service providers."'
Cofetel initially established a fifty-eight percent surcharge5 1 for
Telmex to complete international calls carried by its competi-
tors. 52 Although the surcharge was removed in 1999, competitors
accused Telmex of charging fifteen cents per minute above cost to
complete international calls from the United States into Mexico. 253
The USTR was seeking a ten cents per minute rate for U.S. carri-
ers, and also argued that market competition should allow for
"alternatives to Telmex for terminating international calls."21
The second key issue concerns the settlement rate Telmex
charges foreign long-distance providers to complete calls to the
dialed party in Mexico. The United States argues that both U.S.
carriers and U.S.-backed telecommunications companies in Mex-
ico are victimized by the protectionist practices of Telmex, which
charges exceptionally high rates that most Mexicans cannot
afford. Moreover, Telmex has charged higher rates still for com-
pletion of calls into remote areas of Mexico where the Telmex net-
work is less well established.255
The third key issue argued by the USTR is that Mexican
lawmakers ignored the convention that international calling fees
are set by international agreements by allowing Telmex to negoti-
ate its own fees-another factor that the USTR claims hurts
competition.
25 6
The fourth key issue concerns the perception by the USTR
that Cofetel is not moving quickly or aggressively enough to
reduce Telmex's market dominance.
Finally, the USTR believes that since the long distance ser-
vices sector was opened to competition in 1997, Telmex has gone
from controlling seventy percent of long distance customers to con-
trolling eighty-one percent, while it still controls ninety-five per-
cent of the local telephone service market.25 In the eyes of the
USTR, that makes Telmex a monopoly in the telecommunications
sector capable of effectively preventing U.S.-backed competitors
from competing fairly in the Mexican market.
250. Shetty, supra note 2, at 48.
251. This would represent the amount Telmex could add to the total charge for
completing an international call.




256. Mexican RatesAnger U.S. Phone Giants, A~iz. REPUBLIC, Aug. 19, 2000, at Di.
257. DePalma, supra note 7, at W1.
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At the time the USTR entered the fray, Telmex was charging
a long distance settlement rate of nineteen cents per minute to
competitors for completing connections in Mexico," 8 and about 4.6
cents per minute for originating and terminating calls within
Mexico. Competitors argued that the nineteen cents per minute
rate was too high-as much as two to three times higher than the
rates charged in most developed countries, ' such as the six cents
per minute connection rate for calls between the United States
and Canada and the United States and Great Britain.26 Moreo-
ver, argued U.S. carriers, the balance was heavily skewed in favor
of Telmex because the phone traffic of Mexicans calling home to
Mexico from the United States was much greater than the number
of calls placed to the United States from Mexico.261 The nineteen
cents per minute rate brought some $500 million into Telmex cof-
fers in 2000. AT&T and MCI WorldCom and their subsidiaries in
Mexico wanted Telmex to cut the rate to five cents per minute, but
Telmex refused to go lower than fifteen cents per minute. 62
Telmex countered that the nineteen cents per minute rate was the
same rate dominant U.S. operators were charging in their own
market in 1984 when the new competitors were entering the race
for market share."G One can only wonder about the argumenta-
tive logic of Telmex's comparison to the situation in the United
States eighteen years ago.
Regardless, the USTR's primary concern with Telmex
appears to have more to do with Mexican government complicity
in protecting Telmex in the past from the competition and enforce-
ment of the steps its regulatory agencies have taken to unravel
Telmex's monopolistic practices, than with how Telmex will pro-
ceed to do business in the telecommunications sector. The USTR
also took issue that the regulatory agencies in Mexico are tooth-
less, unresponsive to the concerns of foreign competitors, and are
moving too slowly to suit U.S. business interests, especially at a
258. Telmex Negotiates ILD Termination Fee with AT&T, WorldCOM-Mexico,
GLOBAL NEWS WIRE, Jan. 8, 2001, available at LEXIS, News File.
259. Chris Kraul, U.S. To File WTO Complaint Against Telmex, L.A. TIMEs, July
29, 2000, at C1.
260. Mexican Rates Anger U.S. Phone Giants, supra note 256, at D1. Some
examples of connection costs during peak calling periods for domestic long-distance
service: Argentina: 1.1 cents per minute, Brazil: 2.0 cents per minute, Chile: 1.7 cents
per minute, Mexico: 3.2 cents per minute, Peru: 1.732 cents per minute. See Kraul,
supra note 259, at C1.
261. Smith, supra note 46, at C1.
262. Id.
263. Shetty, supra note 2, at 48.
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time, following NAFTA, when technological advances in telecom-
munications are occurring at a dizzying rate and international
competition in the sector is rapidly increasing.
The USTR warned the Mexican government that unless
Telmex was brought into line, the United States would proceed
with legal action before the WTO. On July 28, 2000, less than a
month after Vincente Fox captured the Mexican presidency, the
USTR made good its threat and filed a complaint against Mexico
at the WTO,64 charging that "Mexico has adopted or maintained
264. See Summary of the Secretariat, Overview of the State-Of-Play of WTO
Disputes, July 13, 2001. The summary of the complaint appears in Ch. VII Pending
Consultations, at 41-42. The summary is reproduced in full as follows:
Mexico - Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services,
complaint by the United States (WT/DS204/1). This request, dated
August 17, 2000, is in respect of Mexico's commitments and
obligations under the GATS with respect to basic and value-added
telecommunications services. According to the United States, since
the entry into force of the GATS, Mexico has adopted or maintained
anti-competitive and discriminatory regulatory measures, tolerated
certain privately-established market access barriers, and failed to
take needed regulatory action in Mexico's basic and value-added
telecommunications sectors. In the view of the United States,
Mexico has, for example: (i) enacted and maintained laws,
regulations, rules, and other measures that deny or limit market
access, national treatment, and additional commitments for service
suppliers seeking to provide basic and value-added
telecommunications services into and within Mexico; (ii) failed to
issue and enact regulations, permits, or other measures to ensure
implementation of Mexico's market access, national treatment, and
additional commitments for service suppliers seeking to provide
basic and value-added telecommunications services into and within
Mexico; (iii) failed to enforce regulations and other measures to
ensure compliance with Mexico's market access, national
treatment, and additional commitments for service suppliers
seeking to provide basic and value-added telecommunications
services into and within Mexico; (iv) failed to regulate, control and
prevent its major supplier, Teldfonos de Mxico ("Telmex"), from
engaging in activity that denies or limits Mexico's market access,
national treatment, and additional commitments for service
suppliers seeking to provide basic and value-added
telecommunications services into and within Mexico; and (v) failed
to administer measures of general application governing basic and
value-added telecommunications services in a reasonable,
objective, and impartial manner, ensure that decisions and
procedures used by Mexico's telecommunications regulator are
impartial with respect to all market participants, and ensure
access to and use of public telecommunications transport networks
and services on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and
conditions for the supply of basic and value-added
telecommunications services. The United States considers that the
alleged action and inaction on the part of Mexico may be
20021 INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 231
anti-competitive and discriminatory regulatory measures, toler-
ated certain privately-established market access barriers, and
failed to take needed regulatory action in Mexico's basic and
value-added telecommunications sectors."26 5 The main grounds
for the complaint were that the termination rates "adversely affect
U.S. interests and deprive Mexican citizens of the benefits of com-
petition."2" In this action, the USTR sought the resolution of
three related issues: (1) lack of effective disciplines over the for-
mer monopoly, Telmex, which is able to use its dominant position
in the market to thwart competition; (2) failure to ensure timely,
cost-oriented interconnection that would permit competing carri-
ers to connect to Telmex customers to provide local, long-distance,
and international service; and (3) failure to permit alternatives to
an outmoded system of charging U.S. carriers above-cost rates for
completing international calls into Mexico." 7
The USTR believed that failure to resolve the issues would
place Mexico "at an enormous disadvantage," and noted as part of
its argument that "Mexico has fewer phone lines per capita than
almost every other major Latin American country, and the growth
in adding new lines over the past few years is far less than that of
Guatemala, Chile, Brazil, and many other countries in Central
inconsistent with Mexico's GATS commitments and obligations,
including Articles VI, XVI, and XVII; Mexico's additional
commitments under Article XVIII as set forth in the Reference
Paper inscribed in Mexico's Schedule of Specific Commitments,
including Sections 1, 2, 3, and 5; and the GATS Annex on
Telecommunications, including Sections 4 and 5. On November 10,
2000, the United States requested the establishment of a panel. On
the same date, the United States notified the Dispute Settlement
Board "DSB" of a request for consultations concerning several
recent measures adopted by Mexico affecting trade in
telecommunication services. At its meeting on December 12, 2000,
the DSB deferred establishment of a panel.
See also Office of the United States Trade Representative, WTO Consultations
Regarding Telecommunications Trade Barriers in Mexico, 65 Fed. Reg. 52369 (Aug.
29, 2000).
265. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Complaint to
the WTO (Aug. 17, 2000). See also, Camila Castellanos, Trust Buster: Mexico's
Federal Competition Commission Gains Clout-and the Wrath of Big Business-As it
Lays Down One Tough Ruling after Another, Bus. MEx., March 1, 2001, available at
LEXIS, News File.
266. Press Release 00-57, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. to
Request WTO Consultations With Mexico Regarding Telecommunications Trade
Barriers (July 28, 2000). See also Chris Kraul, U.S. To File WTO Complaint Against
Telmex, L.A. TuMEs, July 29, 2000, at C1, available at LEXIS, News File.
267. Press Release 00-57, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. to
Request WTO Consultations With Mexico Regarding Telecommunications Trade
Barriers (July 28, 2000) (on file with author).
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and South America."2' Moreover, argued the USTR, "barriers to
competition also undermine Mexico's ability to attract investment
and develop Internet services and electronic commerce, all of
which require a competitive telecommunications market.""6 9 The
USTR sought WTO mediation. The USTR complaint also included
a request for binding sanctions if mediation did not lead to a set-
tlement of the issues within sixty days. °
No agreement was reached at first, and following the sixty
day waiting period following the filing of the complaint, the USTR
announced on October 10, 2000, that the United States would
request the establishment of a WTO dispute settlement panel "to
examine U.S. claims that Mexico has failed to comply with its
WTO commitments in its $12 billion telecommunications services
sector."127' The request for the panel represented "the next step in
the WTO dispute settlement process."272
According to the new USTR complaint, the United States
asserted that Mexico continued to allow Telmex to maintain a "de
facto monopoly to negotiate settlement rates, which prevents
other Mexican carriers from negotiating lower rates."273 A state-
ment released by the USTR declared that:
The policy of the Mexican Government not to permit resale,
i.e., the reselling of the long-distance public network in
Mexico, continues to reinforce Telmex's market dominance
and erode the basis for effective competition in Mexico's
telecommunications market. In addition, the regulatory
agency has been unable to implement regulations to
restrict market abuses by Telmex 4
A) Who Does the USTR Represent?
Telmex's primary long distance competitors are two telecom-
munications companies, Alestra and Avantel. Both companies are
the product of joint ventures between Mexican investors and tele-
communications start-ups and U.S.-based telecommunications
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Kraul, supra note 259, at C1. See also Smith, supra note 46, at C1.
271. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States
to Request WTO Panel on Mexico Telecommunications (Oct. 10, 2000).
272. Id.
273. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2000
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, available at http.'/
www.ustr.gov/pdf/2000-mexico.pdf (last visited December 10, 2001).
274. Id.
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companies. With the forty-nine percent ownership limitation by
foreign companies on all telecommunications entities in force,"
AT&T holds a forty-nine percent stake in Alestra276 and MCI
WorldCom has a forty-five percent holding in Avantel.277 Mexican
banks and other investment groups hold the balance of shares in
both companies. The entities FEMSA, VISA, and ALFA hold fifty-
one percent shares in Alestra, and Banamex bank controls fifty-
one percent of Avantel.278 Since the two companies entered the
long-distance market in 1996, Alestra and Avantel have taken
over about thirty percent of the long-distance market from
Telmex, having done so by capitalizing on Telmex's horrendous
corporate image and high customer dissatisfaction.279
Telmex officials point out that deregulation in the 1990's
allowed more than twenty companies to enter the telecommunica-
tions market and take over one third of that market in the first
year of competition.2 80 During that same time, Telmex claims that
the interconnection cost actually dropped fifty-eight percent due
to the entry of competition into the sector.281
Avantel and Alestra crossed swords with Telmex over net-
work access prior to the USTR getting involved in the dispute. In
May 1998, Avantel and Alestra filed a complaint with the CFC
alleging that Telmex was interfering with Avantel's ability to
establish toll-free "800" numbers for commercial clients.282 Under
the suit, Telmex competitors alleged that the company was
deducting fifty centavos per call from users' pre-paid phone card
for calls made to what were supposed to be toll free numbers.283
Telmex responded that the problems the two rivals were having
breaking into the sector were the result of "poor management and
275. See Amendments to the Foreign Investment Law, D.O, Dec. 24, 1996.
276. Peter J. Howe, Sonus Lands Multi-Billion Dollar Deal, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
12, 2001, at C5.
277. Avantel is also Mexico's leading Internet provider. See International Markets
Fuel Record Growth at Frequency Marketing, Inc. See Loyalty Marketing Company
Celebrates 20th Anniversary, Bus. WIRE, Oct. 29, 2001, available at LEXIS, News
File.
278. Telmex Eyes Hispanic Market, Emerging Markets, DATAFILE THE NEWS, Feb. 5,
2001, (E-media account number 200102051651.m50), available at LEXIS, News File.
279. See generally Tegel, supra note 44.
280. Traci Carl, Callers, US. Phone Carriers in Common Cause Against High
Mexican Rates, ASS'D PREss, Aug. 18, 2000, available at LEXIS, News File.
281. Id.
282. Presunta comisi6n de practices monop6licas en el cobro de llamadas de larga
distancia a travds de nfimeros 800, Denuncia Expediente: DE-07-1998 y RA-33-2000.
283. Telmex Fined By Antitrust Agency Over Toll-Free Access Charges, EL
UNrvERSAL, Apr. 6, 2001, available at LEXIS, News File.
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flawed strategies,"2" including the waste of resources on expen-
sive office construction and furnishings," 5 and the U.S. $1.6 bil-
lion spent to install a long-distance network that Telmex insists
became obsolete during year 2001."' Telmex also countered that
nearly ninety percent of copper wire lines were available to handle
competitor traffic. Moreover, Telmex claimed that consumers
changed carriers twice a year on average-proof that the market
was competitive287 and that Telmex did not control a monopoly.
Strategies and consumer vagaries not withstanding, the CFC
ruled in favor of the Telmex competitors, fining Telmex 7.7 million
pesos for engaging in monopolistic practices by charging to dial
800 numbers from public booths.288
Avantel and Alestra have also taken issue with Telmex's
practice of call bypassing, "a practice whereby Mexican operators
re-route incoming calls from the U.S. to give the impression that
they are national calls." 89 Bypassing, the complaint claimed,
allowed Telmex to collect a nineteen-cent per minute call termina-
tion fee-far above the four cent per minute rate that Avantel and
Alestra convinced the USTR to promote before the WTO. 2 s0
Moreover, Avantel and Alestra both accused Telmex of "slam-
ming," a practice whereby a long-distance provider continues to
charge for service even after the consumer has switched to
another service provider." 1 Finally, Avantel charged that Telmex
had not honored its connection charge agreement, had hindered
access to the Telmex network, "levied arbitrary charges, and...
had not met the targets for allowing competitors a share of the
national telecom business."292
B) The FCC Gets Involved
The USTR was not the only United States agency to go after
284. Smith, supra note 46, at C . According to one industry operator, "AT&T and
MCI came into the market with the assumption that Telmex would continue to
provide poor service and they invested with a view to capture 45 percent of the
market." See Shetty, supra note 2, at 48.
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Telmex. The Federal Communications Commission has taken an
aggressive role in the Mexican telecommunications dispute. Not
only does the FCC have a say in how Telmex has treated U.S.-
backed competitors in Mexico, but the Commission also has a
strong hand to play in how Telmex may do business in the United
States. Established by the Communications Act of 1934, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission ("FCC") is an independent gov-
ernment agency, directly responsible to Congress. The FCC "is
charged with regulating interstate and international communica-
tions by radio, television, wire, satellite and cable. The FCC's
jurisdiction covers the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and
U.S. possessions."29 The FCC organization structure includes
seven operating bureaus devoted to different sectors of the com-
munications universe. "The Bureaus' responsibilities include:
processing applications for licenses and other filings; analyzing
complaints; conducting investigations; developing and implement-
ing regulatory programs; and taking part in hearings."294 One of
the bureaus, the International Bureau, represents the FCC in sat-
ellite and international matters. This bureau has been chiefly
responsible for FCC actions regarding Telmex and the United
States/Mexico telecommunications corridor.
The FCC has been aggressive in the dispute with Telmex,
armed with the power to use considerable leverage in a quid pro
quo fashion in order to advance United States interests under
NAFTA and the WTO. In other words, if Telmex resists opening
the Mexican telecommunications sector to foreign competition, the
FCC has the capacity to delay or deny Telmex's ventures into the
United States telecommunications market.
In 1998, the FCC took action against Telmex's resistance to
negotiating fair settlement rates for the U.S.-Mexico long-distance
corridor. On November 24, the International Bureau issued two
show cause orders regarding the Telmex/Sprint Communications
("TSC") joint venture for providing international switched resale
services between the United States and all international points,
including Mexico. The FCC action arose when competitors AT&T
and MCI WorldCom "filed information with the Commission indi-
cating that TSC and Telmex [were] not in compliance with speci-
fied conditions and expectations,"29 following the 1997 approval
293. See generally Federal Communications Commission, Statement of the FCC, at
http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2002).
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by the FCC to allow TSC to provide long distance services in the
United States market. The International Bureau found in one of
the orders that:
Telmex appears to be failing to comply with its commit-
ment related to the provisioning of private lines and pri-
vate circuits to competitors in violation of TSC's
authorization. This commitment was a condition of TSC's
Section 214 authorization. The Bureau also has serious
concerns about: (1) the lack of progress in opening Mexico's
market to "pure" switched resale; (2) the lack of progress on
negotiations between Telmex and U.S. carriers for accept-
able interim settlement rates for 1998 and 1999; (3) the
continuation of Mexico's discriminatory 58 percent
surcharge for inbound international calls; (4) the inability
of Telmex and U.S. carriers to reach an agreement for "true
up" arrangements relating to the inclusion of Paid-800 ser-
vice in proportionate return (Paid-800 service allows callers
in Mexico to initiate an international call to a U.S. toll-free
number); and (5) the apparent discriminatory conduct by
Telmex with respect to "received collect" traffic (collect calls
made from Mexico to the United States for which the recipi-
ent is billed).29
In a press release following the issuance of the orders, FCC
Chairman William Kennard stated:
Because settlement rates on the U.S.-Mexico route con-
tinue to be significantly above cost, U.S. consumers have to
pay much more than they should to talk to relatives and
friends or to conduct business in Mexico. Lower settlement
rates would mean consumers pay less. Mexican carriers
are the recipients of by far the largest settlement payment
subsidies from U.S. carriers, with payments to Mexican
carriers exceeding $700 million in 1997. A subsidy by U.S.
consumers on this order of magnitude is unacceptable.
Carriers from several other countries in the Americas, such
as the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Venezuela,
have agreed to more significant annual reductions in their
settlement rates than Telmex. Moreover, Mexico is one of
only a few members of the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development ("OECD") that have not already
reduced settlement rates to the relevant benchmark.
Bureaus/International/NewsReleases/1998/nrin8O4O.html (last visited Jan. 18,
2002).
296. Id. The fill order is available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/International/
Orders/1998/da982400.txt (last visited Jan. 18, 2002).
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The Bureau denied Sprint's settlement rate modification
request for 1998 and 1999 because it entailed reductions of
a mere two cents in 1998 and three cents in 1999, and
would have delayed seventy-five percent (15.5 cents) of the
aggregate reductions required to achieve the benchmark
rate of nineteen cents until 2000, forcing American consum-
ers to pay higher calling rates until January 2000. I hope
the International Bureau's Order will encourage Sprint
and other U.S. carriers to negotiate expeditiously settle-
ment rates with Telmex for 1998 and 1999 that are closer
to cost-based rates and that will lead to lower calling prices
for U.S. consumers.
I am also concerned by recent reports that Telmex may be
failing to meet its commitments that the Bureau set as a
condition of granting Telmex entry into the United States
through the TSC venture. The allegations that Telmex
may be stifling competition on the U.S.-Mexico route by
denying facilities to, or discriminating against, U.S. carri-
ers is a potentially serious development. I am also disap-
pointed that Mexican carriers and the Mexican
Government have yet to successfully conclude an agree-
ment to resolve a number of key interconnection issues that
stand in the way of increased competition.297
More recently, in January 1999, the FCC levied a $100,000
fine against Telmex International Ventures USA, a U.S.-based
Telmex entity, claiming that Telmex violated an international
operations agreement by refusing to provide switched resale ser-
vices to destinations including Mexico.29 The fine, called a Notice
of Apparent Liability, was aimed at pressuring the Mexican gov-
ernment through Telmex to adhere to its liberalization commit-
ments under the GATT, NAFTA, and the WTO. The FCC,
however, found itself on shaky legal ground and later dropped the
fine when the FCC's Enforcement Bureau concluded that "the law
in this area was not clear enough to justify the imposition of a
forfeiture."99
Nevertheless, the FCC, in concert with the USTR, continues
297. Statement of FCC Chairman William E. Kennard on the International
Bureau's Actions Concerning Accounting Rates on the United States/Mexico Route
and Potential Violations of Telmex/Sprint Communications' Authorization to Serve
Mexico (Nov. 24, 1988), available at http:/lftp.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/Statements/
stwek887.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2002).
298. See generally Today's Key FCC Actions, WASH. TELECOM NEWSWIRE, July 25,
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to aggressively pursue making the Mexican/United States corridor
a more fair and level playing field for market competition.
XI. MEXICO'S RESPONSE TO UNITED STATES PRESSURE
Given that the international long-distance market between
the United States and Mexico is reported to be the second largest
market in the world,"0 the stakes are very high for whichever ser-
vice entity can capture and retain the most customers. Resolving
some, if not all, of the trade issues over Telmex has given the Fox
administration a prime opportunity to promote itself as an admin-
istration that favors competition as a prime component to growing
a new, modern, and progressive economy that encourages global
trade and investment. At the same time, the Mexican government
has vigorously defended itself over the USTR charges before the
WTO, arguing that at least a dozen competitors are vying for mar-
ket share in the Mexican telecommunications sector and that most
are backed by foreign entities.8 'O Moreover, Mexico charges that
the USTR action before the WTO is nothing more than govern-
ment collusion with U.S.-backed competitors of Telmex to grab
more market-share.3 2
The USTR has perhaps felt pressure from MCI WorldCom
and AT&T to distract Telmex from its own ambitions for interna-
tional expansion into the United States market, as would be
allowed under NAFTA agreements and under the WTO. By bring-
ing an action to the WTO, the USTR would appear to support
WorldCom and AT&T contentions that Telmex has not lived up to
its commitments to the WTO and therefore should not be allowed
into the long-distance resale market in the United States. 3
Mexico's perspective is that the USTR improperly invoked the
adjudicatory capacity of the WTO because the United States FCC
"is applying old bilateral rules of reciprocity, which should have
been replaced by the WTO multilateral regime."0 4
As for the role of the Mexican government in the telecommu-
nications sector, analysts claim that the Fox administration is
hoping to amend laws and regulations over the sector in order to
curtail the lawsuits filed by Telmex and its competitors that have
300. See generally Carl, supra note 280.
301. Mexican Rates Anger U.S. Phone Giants, supra note 256, at D1.
302. Id.
303. Shetty, supra note 2, at 48.
304. Id.
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blocked CFC regulatory decisions from being implemented."°
A) Telmex's Position
Telmex director, Carlos Slim, has maintained that the
USTR's involvement is little more than an effort to protect an
AT&T/MCIWorldCom duopoly at the cost of Telmex market
share. 6 Telmex legal representatives further argue that the
Cofetel rulings have put Telmex at a tremendous disadvantage for
competing in the marketplace. Javier Mondragon, Telmex's gen-
eral counsel, asserted that Telmex's connection rates to competi-
tors are actually lower than similar rates in the United States. He
noted that, "The volume of traffic per line is higher in the United
States, so not only are we equivalent in cost, but with more traffic
on the line, U.S. carriers are realizing more revenues, which has a
direct impact on cost."
307
Telmex also wants to recover costs it says it must absorb in
order to compete in the sector, including a demand to levy a five
cents per minute surcharge to pay for
* adapting its central offices for interconnection to meet the
conditions demanded by new entrants for carrier pre-
selection;
" a new numbering plan;
" advanced signaling protocols;
" U.S.-style billing procedures.
308
As a test to Telmex claims that the costs for such upgrades
would run $1.5 billion, Telecordia Technologies, a Bell-owned ven-
ture, put the estimate for its own similar upgrades at $423 mil-
lion, while other competitors argued the upgrades could be done
for less than $250 million. °9
Looking ahead, however, the growth of the wireless telecom-
munications market in Mexico may render some of the arguments
less effective as the issue of provision of services to fix lines shifts
to the costs for providing mobile services at competitive rates.
XII. THE JANUARY ACCORDS
On January 2, 2001, Telmex finally reached an agreement
305. Id.
306. U.S. Threatens to Take Telmex to WTO; Mexico Telco Accuses US of
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with Avantel and Alestra in which Telmex would open the local
service market to the two competitors in exchange for the remis-
sion of more than $137 million in unpaid connection fees owed by
the two companies. 1 ° All parties also agreed to curtail legal pro-
ceedings brought by each side in the dispute. 1' Even with such an
arrangement, Telmex would still get a portion of the $12 billion
growth in the telecommunications market."' At the same time,
Telmex owed Avantel and Alestra nearly $200 million in refunds
and compensation that the CFC ordered Telmex to pay out in
December 2000.1 Avantel said that it was never notified of the
CFC ruling until sitting down to sign the agreement in January,
2001. In addition, Telmex agreed to cut the interconnection fees it
charged the U.S.-backed long distance competitors from 3.36 cents
per minute to 1.25 cents per minute until 2003,14 following
Cofetel's regulatory ruling during Summer 2000. That rate made
it the second lowest rate in Latin America; Chile had the lowest
rate of 0.5 cents per minute.1 Cofetel did not publish the fee
rates until October, however, because the agency was awaiting
the outcome of a Telmex injunction seeking to invalidate special
control rules issued by Cofetel on September 12, 2000.316
The court uncharacteristically rejected the injunction request
in October, at which point Cofetel was able to announce the rate
on October 6. Telmex promptly cried foul and again went to court
in Mexico to have the rate regulation overturned. Telmex argued
that the rule enables regulators "to treat dominant companies like
Telmex differently from smaller companies to foster competi-
tion,""' essentially creating an uneven playing field for Telmex.
According to a statement released by Telmex following the Cofetel
ruling, the new regulations "would result in higher prices for con-
sumers while depriving them of the benefits of Telmex's increased
productivity.... The only beneficiaries will be the competing com-
panies, which will be able to increase profits because of unde-
served advantages that actually harm the national interests."18
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Another Telmex executive claimed that the low rate would result
in "disinvestments, not investment, in our network.""'9 The
Cofetel ruling did not, however, cover "the cost of 'special projects'
to facilitate interconnection or co-location, which is the cause of
friction between Telmex and Avantel."3"0 Not coincidentally, the
release of the rate by Cofetel occurred just three days before
USTR Barshefsky was due to arrive in Mexico City to discuss the
dispute with Mexican officials.32'
A further setback was dealt to Telmex when in March 2001,
the Federal Competition Commission ("CFC") found that Telmex
maintained a monopoly over local network access for its long-dis-
tance competitors by charging long-distance carriers both a resale
fee and an interconnection fee, as well as restricting the competi-
tors' access to Telmex networks.122 The CFC ordered Telmex to
pay a 33.2 million peso penalty.2 ' The ruling apparently was
made December 13, 2000, but some of the parties were not notified
until four months later. Telmex harshly criticized the CFC deci-
sion as having been reached in an ad hoc manner without regard
to current Mexican law, and argued that Telmex was doing noth-
ing different than is done "all over the world," in the words of one
Telmex executive.24
On May 30, 2001, Avantel's parent company, MCI WorldCom,
and Telmex agreed to a settlement rate of 15.5 cents per minute
rate from the United States to Mexico for 2001, retroactive to Jan-
uary 1, 2001."' The rate would go down further in 2002, to 13.5
cents per minute, and down again to ten cents per minute in
2003.26 The agreement was seen by some analysts as a tangible
sign the Fox administration was fulfilling its pledge to stimulate
competition in key Mexican industries where the "dominant play-
ers have long called the tune."'27 Moreover, Communications Min-
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ister Pedro Cerisola was actively involved in bringing the two
sides to an agreement.
While the agreement lowers the rate from nineteen cents per
minute prior to the settlement, AT&T balked at the new rate, say-
ing it was still too high, 2' citing an industry study that indicated
the actual cost to complete calls from the United States to Mexico
is less than four cents per minute.29 On June 20, 2001, AT&T,
along with Concert, an international joint venture with British
Telecom,"' filed a complaint with the United States FCC contend-
ing that the agreement between WorldCom and Telmex did not
meet Mexico's WTO commitments," and would result in consum-
ers in the United States paying Telmex and other Mexican carri-
ers almost a billion dollars more than necessary over the
subsequent three years.3 2 AT&T asked the International Bureau
of the FCC to reject the WorldCom settlement rate proposal on the
following additional grounds:
(1) The proposed rates were far above cost-based levels,
which would be less than 4 cents. The rates also exceeded
what Mexican carriers paid Telmex for facilities and ser-
vices needed to terminate calls from the U.S., which are
under 4.5 cents.
(2) The agreement isn't in the public interest because the
reductions are insufficient and Telmex would be able to
"whipsaw" other U.S. carriers into similar rates, barring
the negotiation of deeper reductions.
(3) There is no justification for this massive, above-cost out-
payment to a neighboring country that supposedly opened
its telecommunications market to competition more than
four years ago, or for such blatant discrimination against
U.S. carriers."'
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Moreover, AT&T took issue with Telmex's negotiating style,
claiming that "Telmex's consistent strategy is to negotiate only
with the U.S. carrier from which it believes it may obtain the most
advantageous agreement, and then to pressure other U.S. carriers
to accept the same agreement."3 Telmex responded that its pol-
icy was indeed to negotiate with the foreign carrier having the
highest volume of calls, assuming the other carriers would then
follow suit with whatever was agreed to.335 MCIWorldCom over-
took AT&T in long-distance traffic between the United States and
Mexico in 2000 and therefore had proprietary negotiating rights.
Arturo Elias, Telmex's corporate director, explained in an inter-
view that rules by Cofetel and the FCC are explicit: "The rules say
that the carrier which has the largest traffic negotiates the tar-
iffs[,I and that was WorldCom. 336
Nevertheless, Telmex and U.S. competitors subsequently
agreed on an international connection fee in the neighborhood of
fourteen cents per minute.3 7 Telmex was still not satisfied with
the agreement because the pressure brought by international and
domestic competitors, telepirates, and lower international tariffs
elsewhere has resulted in significantly lower revenues for Telmex,
from $1.9 billion in 1995 to about $1 billion in 2001.8
By April 2001, Alestra was reporting a thirty to forty percent
increase in profitability after Telmex's lowered connection charges
following the December decision .3  Alestra also benefited from
focusing market growth on servicing business customers. Alestra
projects that by year-end 2001, the company would have signed
service contracts with approximately four hundred businesses
using about fifty thousand newly installed local business lines. 4°
Alestra was poised to invest U.S. $70 million in its infrastructure
in 2001, while Avantel committed about U.S. $180 million to net-
work development. 41 Telmex still holds sway over the competi-
tion, however, because it "can choose when and where to allow
Avantel and Alestra access to its local network, a crucial lever
until the two smaller companies complete their own networks, if
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they ever do." 42 Analysts note, too, that Telmex will resist open-
ing access to the competition and that Telmex will retain some
eighty-five percent of the local calls market into 2005.843
In the mean time, since Avantel and Alestra have gained
badly needed concessions from Telmex, the competition strategy
appears to be shifting away from disputes in the regulatory forum
and into the market forum. One reporter following the current
state of affairs in the Mexican telecommunications sectors wrote
in Fall 2001 that the vitriol has yielded, at least for the time
being, to letting the market determine the future, although much
frustration still remains.
"We are going to battle in the marketplace instead of at the
regulatory level over practices which were not legal," says
Rodrigo Martinez, Avantel's deputy head of product mar-
keting. "We are now going to square up and see who is actu-
ally the best at winning customers.""
For its part, the USTR appears to remain skeptical and has
challenged the Fox administration to decide once and for all if
Mexico will enforce its own laws and monitor more aggressively
its regulations against monopolistic practices within its borders.
XIII. LOOKING AHEAD: WHERE TO FROM HERE?
The settlement rate finally agreed to between Telmex and its
rivals for the 2001 to 2003 period is significant in that the parties
involved hope to use the agreement as an opportunity to turn the
corner away from regulated rate determination and toward rate
setting agendas determined by market-based international termi-
nation rates beginning in 2004.11
Still, Telmex has attempted to fight the Cofetel rulings in
court, arguing among other things that capping its tariffs until
2003, during a time when inflation has struck hard in Mexico, is
in effect protecting the U.S.-backed competitors while going
against the public interest of Mexico.146 Telmex is also fighting in
court the success its competitors achieved in folding into the cost-
oriented interconnection regime Telmex's high charges for com-
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structure is underdeveloped. 47 There is no denying, however, that
the fees Telmex charged the competition for access to the Telmex
network were monopolistic in appearance. In addition to the 3.36
cents per minute Telmex was charging long-distance competitors
to originate and terminate calls on its network, Telmex was also
charging an additional 3.36 cents per minute if the call termi-
nated in a Telmex local-service area.34
Alestra and Avantel continue to hammer away at both
Telmex and the Mexican government. They accuse Telmex of
intentionally ignoring international conventions signed by the
Mexican government to encourage competition, and Mexican offi-
cials for not enforcing its regulations in the sector generally, and
rulings against Telmex in particular.
4 9
A) Others Entering the Fray
Telmex's antitrust problems will not go away following settle-
ments with Avantel and Alestra. Other telecommunications com-
panies are growing restless for more market share. In May 2001,
the Mexican telecom company Miditel considered filing a com-
plaint against Telmex with the CFC alleging that Telmex and
other domestic competitors were colluding against Miditel to keep
the company out of the long-distance market.35 0 The allegations
arose over a letter sent by Telmex and other telecom companies to
CFC requesting that Miditel's long-distance license be revoked
because the company was providing illegal long-distance ser-
vices. 51 Telmex also requested "that rights held by subsidiary
Midicel to wireless transmission frequencies be cancelled."352
In an interesting twist to the dispute, another Telmex com-
petitor, Axtel, a provider of wireless services in Monterey and
Mexico City, accused Telmex, as well as Avantel and Alestra, of
causing their squabble to stifle other local competition. Axtel
claims that the lower interconnection fees brought about by the
Avantel/Alestra fight against Telmex negatively impacted Axtel's
ability to generate the resources needed to expand its own mar-
ket."3 Axtel claims it needed at least a five cents per minute
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interconnection rate to pay for growing its network." Axtel also
claims that Alestra and Avantel declined to sign interconnection
contracts with its network. 55 In a statement released by Axtel in
March 2000, the company accused Alestra and Avantel of imped-
ing competition: "Instead of encouragement, Axtel and other inde-
pendent telecos now face interconnection obstacles that have been
thrown up by the very carriers that have unfurled the banner of
competition in Mexico. " "',
Alestra countered that Axtel, other domestic competitors, and,
the U.S.-backed ventures were all in the same situation because
the Mexican government had done little since 1997 to stimulate
competition. Moreover, Alestra pointed out, Axtel is itself part of
a joint venture with Bell Canada International, which, not coinci-
dentally, has a joint-venture agreement with Telmex.3 7 Clearly,
this serves to demonstrate how confusing are the competition
issues and antagonisms in the Mexican telecommunications
sector.
Telmex has other problems to contend with that arose while it
was distracted by defending itself from the loss of its monopoly;
not the least of which is the practice of telepiracy from domestic
competitors. The practice, known as bypassing, occurs when a
competitor routes thousands of calls through one domestic phone
account in order to circumvent paying international connection
fees. Telepiracy has robbed Telmex of revenues in excess of $285
million year-about 1.6 billion minutes in lost charges, according
to Telmex officials."' 8 Interestingly, the practice was employed
legally in the United States in the 1980's by WorldCom and Sprint
as a means to compete against AT&T's then monopoly over long-
distance service. 59 While a legitimate practice in the U.S., until
late 2001 Cofetel continued to shield Telmex from competition by
making it a crime to route calls through Telmex's network without
paying the nineteen cents per minute connection fee."6
Even with agreements in the last year between Telmex and
U.S. competitors to establish a rate of about fourteen cents per
minute, the connection fee is still well above international rates,
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Telmex long-distance network. Moreover, the penalty for
telepiracy is only about $60,000, hardly a deterrent for companies
that stand to make millions through their enterprise, which are
largely built on the sale of phone calling cards to low-income Mexi-
can nationals living in the United States."'
XIV. CONCLUSION
President Fox must know that foreign investors will become
more hesitant to pursue business ventures with Mexican subsidi-
aries and investment partnerships in Mexico unless monopolistic
practices are effectively curtailed. There is a pressing need for his
administration to demonstrate that it can move effectively against
the large corporate entities in the most important sectors of the
economy. Telmex represents a symbolic as much as a practical
challenge to overcoming Mexico's historical tolerance of monopo-
lies. One analyst notes that tougher antitrust policymaking and
tighter scrutiny by Mexican regulators could have a long-term
effect on how Mexico's largest corporations build business models
around dominant market share and high margin structures. 62
As long as Telmex continues to control nearly eighty percent
of the long-distance market, and nearly all local telephone lines in
Mexico, every competitor in the telecommunications sectors will
have to pay a toll in order to conduct business over those lines. In
that regard, Telmex will still have a de facto monopoly as nearly
every customer who dials onto a phone line must dial into the
Telmex infrastructure.
The WTO Telecom Agreement significantly accelerated the
opening of telecommunications markets to competition in the sig-
natory countries and helped to stimulate "reforms and binding
international commitment to the future liberalization of basic
telecommunications."3" The principles embraced in the Agree-
ment allowed countries to choose any way to regulate the market,
as long as that regulation was market oriented. "In the telecom-
munications sector, a government's commitments to free trade
may not be strong enough to guarantee real market access for for-
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eign suppliers of services because of the very high levels of concen-
tration. Monopolistic suppliers could frustrate competition from
new foreign entrants despite trade liberalization commitments."3"
Mexico thought its privatization of Telmex satisfied its obligations
under the WTO to promote the liberalization of competition and
trade in the telecommunications sector. But Mexico missed the
point that for a good market-oriented policy to succeed, what is
important is not whether there is governmental ownership in a
company, but whether the market is really opened to competition.
The fact that Mexico privatized Telmex alone did not bring Mexico
within its obligations under the WTO Agreement. In reality, free
trade was inhibited by the way Mexico chose to regulate Telmex.
Mexico has made progress in promoting competition in its
telecommunications market by implementing new laws and regu-
lations and creating or fortifying needed administrative agencies.
Mexico has not, however, fully addressed its compliance with its
WTO commitments. Mexico must ensure competition in its mar-
ket by enforcing the rules already issued. Its agencies in charge of
preventing anti-competitive conduct must enforce the laws.
Absent this enforcement, Mexico will not make any progress
regardless of the amount of laws in place or the new agencies
created.
As of January 2003, Telmex will be allowed to apply for
adjustments to its service rates, charging different local service
rates in different states, and possibly re-igniting the dispute."5
Changes will be submitted first to Cofetel in 2002, and rates will
be established based on volume, distance, and time. 6 Much of
what happens over the next year as competitors position them-
selves in the sector will prove crucial to future negotiations.
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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF THE TELMEX DISPUTE
1939 Law of General Routes of Communications enacted
1940 Communications Law of 1940 enacted
1947 Telmex is born from the merger of Empresas Telefonos
Ericsson and Campafiia Telef6nica Y Tegrdfica Mexicana
1968 SCT overhauls, expands, and modernizes Telmex infra-
structure
1972 Mexican government acquires 51 percent of Telmex capital
stock
1973 Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate For-
eign Investment (LPMI) enacted
1976 SCT renews Telmex concession for 30 years; Telmex incor-
porated into the Communications and Transportation
branch of government
1980s Salinas moves to prepare Telmex for private sale; Telmex
reorganizes
1985 Mexico City earthquake cripples Telmex infrastructure;
leads to new round of modernization and service expan-
sion
1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act passed in the United
States
1988 Telecommunications Trade Act enacted with the Omnibus
bill
1989 Regulations to the LPMI (RLPMI) enacted
1990 Mexico signs Brady Plan agreement to restructure national
debt and opens the way for privatization of Telmex
1990 Mexican Consumption Tax repealed; Telmex earnings
increase 68 percent
1990 Telmex fully privatized
1993 Federal Law on Economic Competition
1993 Foreign Investment Law of 1993 (FIL) enacted
1993 Federal Competition Commission (CFC) established
1994 WTO comes into being, enters into force January 1995
1994 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) takes
effect
1995 Federal Telecommunications Law of 1995 enacted
1995 Mexico enters into full participation in NAFTA
1996 Federal Telecommunications Commission (Cofetel) estab-
lished
1997 February Accord under GATS paves wave for opening Mex-
ico's telecommunications market for foreign competition;
goes into force January 1, 1998
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1997 Basic Telecommunications Agreement (BTA) under the
WTO established; Reference Paper under the BTA estab-
lishes market access commitments for services in the tele-
communications service sector and sets forth what
constitutes anti-competitive practices by signatory coun-
tries
1997 Mexican government opens long-distance services to compe-
tition
1998 CFC determined Telmex was engaged in monopoly practice
in the local and long-distance carrier market
1998 Avantel and Alestra file complaints against Telmex with
CFC for Telmex interference in market access
1998 U.S. FCC fines Telmex for unfair practices in the U.S. tele-
communications service market
1998 WTO Telecom Agreement takes effect
June 1999 Local judge awards Telmex definitive suspension of the
CFC allegation, but allows regulatory action if it could be
shown to be in the best interests of consumers
July 2000 USTR begins to bring charges against Mexico before the
WTO
September COFETEL issues special antitrust rules against Telmex
2000 monopoly and orders a lower interconnection rate fee
October USTR requests convening of a WTO dispute settlement
2000 panel
October Mexican officials lower interconnection rates from 3.36
2000 cents per minute to 1.25 cents following court rejection of
Telmex injunction
December Decision issued by CFC ordering Telmex to reduce phone
2000 access fees charged to its competitors
January January Accord in which Telmex and Alestra and Avantel
2001 reach agreement on connection fees
March CFC declares Telmex engaged in monopoly practice over
2001 local network
May 2001 Telmex and MCIWorldCom agree to 13.5 cents per minute
rate and 10 cents per minute in 2003
November USTR asks WTO panel to take up U.S. complaint against
2001 Mexico for failing to meet its WTO commitments to open
its $12-billion telecommunications market
